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Affirmative Action: Are the Equal Protection and
Title VII Tests Synonymous?
Maureen E. Lally-Green*
"I said there was a society of men among us, bred up from their
youth in the art of proving by words multiplied for the purpose,
that white is black, and black is white, according as they are paid."'
The media's use2 of Swift's famous description of lawyers to
criticize the recent Supreme Court affirmative action3 decision in
Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara, California reflects
the public's sharp division as to why an employment decision made
on the basis of race or sex, the "black" in Swift's quote, should
not be discrimination when it is in the context of affirmative action,
the "white".' In the past decade, eight Supreme Court employment-
* B.S., 1971, Duquesne University; J.D., 1974, Duquesne University
School of Law; Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
The author acknowledges the valuable editorial comments of Bruce Bagin,
J.D.
1. Gulliver's Travels, Jonathan Swift.
2. National Review, Apr. 24, 1987, pp. 17-18. Swift's quote introduced
an article criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency of Santa Clara, California, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). See infra text
accompanying notes 355-407. The author of this article argued that voluntary
affirmative action in the public sector is against the law and concluded that:
"Social justice will be reserved for those with tribal affliations and accredited
victim status, proving once more that under the liberal regime, you have to have
a lot of clout to be a victim. Being an individual isn't enough." Id. at 18.
3. The term "affirmative action" refers to policies that provide prefer-
ences based on membership in a designated group; however, no individual of the
disadvantaged class has a claim to affirmative action and no individual beneficiary
of relief need show he or she was a victim of discrimination. Such policies range
from "weak" efforts, such as advertising or special recruitment efforts, to
"strong" efforts, such as reserving a specific number of openings exclusively for
members of the preferred group. The terms "affirmative action", "preferential
treatment", and "affirmative discrimination" are used synonymously; however,
the term "affirmative action" avoids the negative connotation of "preference"
or "discrimination". Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327 (1986).
4. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
5. In affirmative action circles, critics have been called either "fair shakers"
or "social engineers." The "fair shakers" are concerned with guaranteeing equality
of opportunity, abolishing barriers to fair participation, and giving the individual a
fair shake. The "social engineers" are ones who are concerned with results and
who argue that, absent discrimination, all groups would be represented in the
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related 6 affirmative action cases7 demonstrate that sharp division
through thirty-five majority, concurring or dissenting opinions that
span over six hundred pages of official and unofficial text.'
institutions and occupations of society roughly in proportion to their representation
in the population. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers,
99 HAjv. L. REv. 1312 (1986).
Anti-affirmation action authors include among others: Abrams, supra and
Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed
Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students (1987). There, the
author states: "Affirmative action [quotas], at least at universities, is the source of
what I fear is a long-term deterioration of the relations between the races in
America." Id. at 96-97.
Pro-affirmative action authors include among others: Jones, The Genesis and
Present Status of Affirmative Action in Employment: Economic, Legal and Political
Realities, 70 IowA L. REv. 901 (1985); Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A
Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HAiv. L. REV. 1327 (1986); and,
Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Terms Affirmative Action Cases, 99 HARv.
L. REv. 78 (1986).
6. The Supreme Court has dealt with the subject of affirmative action in
other areas such as student assignments. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S.
430 (1968).
The issue of preferences has also been addressed in the area of admissions to
law and medical schools. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (the issue of a
minority group set-aside for law school was moot because petitioner was about to
graduate); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, (1978).
In Bakke, petitioner, a white individual who was denied admission to the University
of California medical school because of a minority group set-aside, challenged the
constitutionality of that affirmative action plan. Unable to avoid deciding the matter,
four members of the Court ruled that the set-aside was illegal under Title VI. Four
members ruled that the set-aside was constitutional under the middle-tier analysis
and that the school could take race into account as a "plus" factor in selecting
qualified applicants for admission. Justice Powell voted with the first four, reasoning
that the set-aside failed to meet the "strict scrutiny" test for equal protection
challenges of racial classifications because there had been no finding of prior
discrimination by the school. Id.
7. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) ("We-
ber"); Fullilove v. Klutznick 448 U.S. 448 (1979) ("Fullilove"); Firefighters v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561 (1984) ("Stotts"); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 106 S. Ct.
1843 (1986) (" Wygant"); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' International Association
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) ("Local
28"); Local 93 Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986) ("Local
93'1; United States v. Philip Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) ("Paradise"); and
Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara, California, 107 S. Ct. 1442
(1987) ("Johnson").
Another employment-related case was County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440
U.S. 625 (1979) (challenge to minority-group hiring quota imposed by a district
court on an employer who used an allegedly biased examination for hiring purposes
was found moot because by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the
county had revised its hiring procedures to conform with the district court's order
and had extensively hired minority-group persons; therefore, any discriminatory
effects of its previous practices were substantially cured and the quota was not
necessary.)
8. The chart below sets out each case with an indication of the number of
[1987 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 297
There are Justices on the Supreme Court who would allow the
use of race or sex only to compensate "identifiable victims" of
employer discrimination but never to benefit nonvictims, no matter
how egregious the employer's past discrimination. 9 There are Justices
who would allow the use of race or sex to compensate both
"identifiable victims" and nonvictims only in particularly egregious
situations where the remedy is not excessive.10 There are Justices
who would allow the use of race or sex to benefit nonvictims where
a manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category is
shown and the remedy is temporary, designed to eliminate that
manifest imbalance and does not impinge on the nonminority's
legal rights." Finally, there are Justices who would allow the use
of race or sex when nonvictims are compensated for "societal
discrimination" and the remedy is designed to eliminate statistical
imbalances in job categories. 2
It is clear that the Supreme Court has decided affirmative action
cases on the facts and circumstances reflected in the relevant records
and has refused to articulate a controlling test for all types of
affirmative action plans whether voluntary, part of a consent decree
approved by a court, a contempt order or a remedy ordered by
the court. What becomes evident is that the standards used by the
pages in official text or unofficial text ("-"), of the ruling and of how each Justice
ruled. A "*" indicates that the Justice authored an opinion. An "x" indicates that
the Justice did not participate in the decision.
Brgr Stwrt Brnnn Mrshll Blckmn Pwll Stvns Wht Rhnqst O'Cnnr Scl
Weber 5-2 D M M* M M/C* x x M D*
-62 pp.
Fullilove 6-3 M* D* C C C* M/C* D* M D
-106 pp.
Stotts 5-4 M D D D* M C M* .M C*
-34 pp.
Wygant 5-4 M D D* D M* D C M M/C*
-28 pp.
Local 28 5-4 D M* M M M/C* M D* D* M/C/D*
-68 pp.
Local 93 6-3 D M* M M M M D* D* M/C
-33 pp.
Paradise 5-4 M* M M M/C* CS D* D D* D
-30 pp.
Johnson 6-3 M* M M M M/C* D* D C* D*
-16 pp.
9. Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J., in Local 28, 92 L.Ed. 2d at 403-04;
Scalia, J., in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 1456-76.
10. This position was reflected in Local 28 in the opinions of White, J.,
and O'Connor, J., both of whom dissented arguing that the remedy of a quota
there was excessive.
11. The plurality opinions in Weber and Johnson.
12. With "societal discrimination", the pervasive consequences of racial
discrimination would validate an employer's use of race-conscious remedies regardless
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Supreme Court to test the validity of voluntary and court-ordered
affirmative action plans for both public and private employers are
the same whether the challenge is under equal protection or Title
VII.
This article suggests that the controlling test for discrimination
in both Title VIII3 and equal protection challenges and for all types
of affirmative action plans should be whether there was a dem-
onstration of intentional discrimination by the employer. If so, the
remedy should be narrowly tailored to eliminate that discrimination.
Intentional employer discrimination can be shown in all situations,
except the judicial remedy, by evidence of a firm basis 14 that the
employer has intentionally engaged in past or present discrimination
or has used policies or practices that have had a discriminatory
effect. Such discrimination, however, cannot be demonstrated sim-
ply by presenting evidence of a manifest statistical imbalance of
the minority in the job category to the relevant labor market. The
remedy limitation can be met only if the remedy is designed to
eliminate the identified discrimination of the employer, is tempo-
rary, provides for goals with "safety valves" and does not impinge
on the employee's Title VII rights or expectation interests.
In Part I of this article, the eight Supreme Court cases are
reported. In Part II, the proposed test is analyzed in the context
of those cases.' The final section, Part III, is the conclusion.
of whether the employer itself engaged in discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 369-73 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part, advancing the societal discrimination approach); Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1847-48 (1986) (Powell, J., writing
for the plurality, rejecting the societal discrimination approach).
13. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17
(1982).
14. See the discussion infra notes 427-434 and accompanying text. See Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1461.
15. This article will not specifically address the affirmative action required
by Executive Order 11246, as amended, and its implementing regulations, including
41 C.F.R. Part 60-2 (known as revised Order 4). Note, however, that employers
must comply with this order in order to do business with some federal or state
governmental agencies. For the reader's information, Executive Order 11246, signed
into law by President Johnson, requires federal contractors to take affirmative action
by hiring minority-group members and women or risk losing their federal contracts.
Prior to the executive order, affirmative action had been required within the federal
government but had been practiced only on a voluntary basis by federal contractors.
Over the past few years, there has been intense debate concerning whether employers
should be required to establish goals and timetables for hiring and promoting women
and members of minority groups. However, with respect to federal contactors,
neither Executive Order 11246 nor the regulations promulgated by the Labor
Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) have been





Before addressing the cases, it should be noted that discrimination
under Title VII can be shown by evidence that the employer
intentionally discriminated ("individual disparate treatment"), in-
tentionally limited, segregated or classified employees or applicants
in a manner that deprives those individuals of employment oppor-
tunities ("systemic disparate treatment") or otherwise adversely
affected an individual's status as an employee ("adverse impact").'
6
It is also important to note that the employer can invoke judicially
created defenses or statutory exceptions.' 7 Under "individual dis-
parate treatment", if it is shown by direct evidence, (i.e., the
"smoking gun" or circumstantial evidence which meets the Mc-
Donald Douglas-Burdine test,'") that the employer intentionally
16. These are causes of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(a) and
§§ 703(a)(1) and (2). See the text infra of § 703(a)(1) and (2) at note 25.
17. The statutory defenses are found in § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h),
which provides, in pertinent part:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards of compensation or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system or a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to em-
ployees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex or national orgin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin ...
18. McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) ("McDonald
Douglas"); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981) ("Burdine"). McDonald Douglas requires the plaintiff to show that he
belongs to a class protected by Title VII, qualifies for an available position, and
was rejected for that position in favor of a non-class member. The defending
employer need only produce evidence which articulates a legitimate, nondiscrim-
inatory reason for the selection of the non-class member. Burdine, 450 U.S. at
252-60. The plaintiff then bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact that
this reason was merely pretext. McDonald Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.
A nonminority has a protected right against "reverse discrimination" under
§ 703(a)(1). McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportion Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
A claim of reverse discrimination often arises in the context of the employer's
adoption of a voluntary affirmative action plan. Reverse discrimination can be
shown by direct evidence of discrimination or by a demonstration of circumstantial
evidence in accordance with the McDonald Douglas test. The defending employer
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discriminated against the plaintiff, the employer is liable to that
victim, 19 unless the employer proves that the classification is a bona
fide occupational qualification. 20 Under "systemic disparate treat-
ment", if it is shown that the employer intentionally uses a policy
or practice or classifies employees in a way that limits opportunities
for members of a protected class, the employer is liable to all of
the actual victims in that class. 21 Under "adverse impact", if it is
shown that an employer's facially neutral practice disqualifies sub-
stantially disproportionate numbers of the protected class and the
employer fails to prove the business necessity of that practice,
members of the class need not prove that the employer had a
discriminatory purpose; a showing of discriminatory impact is
sufficient.22 While both individual and systemic disparate treatment
claims involve a showing of the employer's intentional discrimi-
nation through the victims' testimony and often through statistics,
adverse impact claims require only a showing of discriminatory
impact on a class by statistics.
need only produce evidence which articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision (i.e., the affirmative action plan). The plaintiff must prove
that this reason was merely pretext and that the plan is invalid. For these issues
the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. McDonald Douglas, 411 U.S. at
807. See also Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449-50.
19. Remedies may include an order to rehire or reinstate the employee or
to award him backpay.
20. Section 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter ... it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in these
certain instances whose religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particluar business or enterprise.
The bona fide occupational qualification defense does not reach race or color
discrimination.
21. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
The term "pattern or practice" is found in § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e6(a)
which provides:
(a) Whenever the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] has rea-
sonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in
a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a
nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described,
the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] may bring a civil ac-
tion...
22. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15. For example, intelligence tests that
have not been validated do not enjoy the § 703(h) privilege and cannot be justified
by the "business necessity" defense. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.* 424
(1971).
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Discrimination under the equal protection clause, in the employ-
ment context, is shown by evidence that the employer intentionally
limited, segregated or classified employees in a manner that de-
prived those individuals of their rights under the law. 23 The Title
VII concept of adverse impact has no application in an equal
protection context .24
B. The Cases
In this section, each of the cases will be reported in chronological
order and in a detailed fashion so that the reader has an appreci-
ation of the precedential value of each decision, as well as the
factual context, the procedural posture and the legal analysis re-
flected in each case. The common denominator of the eight cases
is the interrelationship of section 703(a),25 section 7030)26 and, in
23. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), the Court held that the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, which contains an equal protection component, prohibited the United
States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups. Id.
24. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis, a test was
administered generally to prospective government employees to determine whether
the applicants had acquired a particular level of verbal-realted skills. Id. at 235-
36. Unsuccessful black applicants for employment as police officers in the District
of Columbia claimed that the police department's recruiting procedures, including
the test, violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment because the test
had the discriminatory impact of screening out black candidates and bore no
relationship to job performance.
The Supreme Court held that the "adverse impact" standards applicable to
Title VII cases do not apply to claims of invidious racial discrimination under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 236. The Court first stated
that the purpose of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, as
well as the due process clause of the fifth amendment, is the prevention of
official governmental conduct which discriminates on the basis of race. Id. at
239. The Court then held that an official act is not unconstitutional solely because
it has a racially disproportionate impact. Id. at 239-41. Such acts should be
examined with regard to whether they reflect a racially discriminatory purpose.
Id. If the act is neutral on its face, the court must determine whether it is applied
so as to invidiously discriminate on the basis of race. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section 703(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive an individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
[1987
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cases involving judicial action, section 706(g) 27 of Title VII.2 s When
a public employer is involved, the equal protection clause is also
implicated.
29
1. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber (" Weber")3 °
Sections 703(a), (d) and (j) of Title VII are not violated when private
sector employers and unions take affirmative race-conscious steps
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j). Section 703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, ... labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the-race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred
or classified for employment by any ... labor organization, admitted to
membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or
employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in any community, state, section, or other area, or
in the available work force in any community, state, section, or other area.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Section 706(g) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice .... the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.... No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstate-
ment of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement,
or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any
back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled or
was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for
any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin....
28. Section 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d), is sometimes also cited and
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprentice-
ship or other training or retaining, including on-the-job training programs
to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program
established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
29. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as well as
the equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment
must be analyzed in cases involving public employers.
30. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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designed to elimiflate a manifest racial imbalance in traditionally
segregated job categories. Such action is lawful as long as the
measure is only temporary, does not create an absolute bar to the
advancement of white employees, does not require the replacement
of white workers with new black hires, and is not intended to
maintain a racial balance.
In 1974, the United Steelworkers of America ("Union") and the
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. ("Kaiser") entered into a
master collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement") that covered
the terms and conditions of employment at fifteen Kaiser plants;
the Agreement included an affirmative action plan ("Plan") de-
signed to eliminate the conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's
almost exclusively white craftwork forces.3" The Agreement pro-
vided for hiring goals for black craftworkers for each Kaiser plant
equal to the percentage of blacks in the respective local labor
forces. To enable the plants to meet these hiring goals, the Plan
provided for on-the-job training programs to teach both black and
white unskilled production workers the skills necessary to become
craftworkers.3 2 The Plan reserved for black employees fifty percent
of the openings in these in-plant training programs.33
The Weber controversy was generated by the operation of this
Plan at Kaiser's plant in Gramercy, Louisiana, where, until 1974,
Kaiser hired as craftworkers only persons who had had prior craft
experience.3 4 Since blacks traditionally had been excluded from
craft unions, few were able to meet such credentials; therefore,
only 1.83% of the skilled craftworkers at the plant were black even
though the work force in the area was approximately 39076 black. 5
As required by the Agreement, Kaiser established a program to
train its production workers to fill craft openings. The Agreement
permitted Kaiser to select trainees on the basis of seniority, with
the proviso that at least fifty percent of the new trainees be black
until the percentage of black craftworkers equaled the percentage
of blacks in the local labor force.
3 6
31. Id. at 197-98. Justice Brennan noted that petitioners contended that
the Plan was justified because they feared that black employees would sue for
racial discrimination. In the alternative, petitioners claimed that the Plan repre-
sented an attempt to comply with Executive Order 11246. Id. at 209 n.9.
32. Id. at 198.
33. Id. at 199.
34. Id. at 198.
35. Id. at 198-99.
36. Id. at 199.
[1987
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The first training class consisted of seven black and six white
craft trainees. Weber was a white production worker with more
seniority than any of the seven blacks selected, but with less
seniority than the six white trainees. 7 He brought a class action
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana claiming that the affirmative action program granted a
preference to a junior black employee at the expense of a senior
white employee and, therefore, resulted in discrimination in vio-
lation of sections 703(a) 8 and (d)3 9 of Title VII. Both the district
court 40 and the court of appeals 41 agreed. The Supreme Court
granted certiorar 42 and reversed.
43
Justice Brennan first pointed out that the only question before
the Court was whether Title VII forbids private employers and
unions from voluntarily agreeing on bona fide affirmative action
plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the
purpose provided in the Plan.4 4 After reviewing the legislative
history of Title VII, Justice Brennan concluded that the historical
context from which the Act arose 45 and the language of section
703(j) 46 indicate that the Title VII prohibition against race discrim-
ination did not forbid "all" race-conscious affirmative action plans.
With respect to section 703(j), he reasoned that if Congress had
meant to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action, it would
have stated in section 7030) that Title VII did not "require or
permit" racially preferential integration efforts instead of merely
37. Id.
38. See supra note 25 for the text of § 703(a).
39. See supra note 28 for the text of § 703(d) of Title VII.
40. 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
41. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
42. 439 U.S. 1045 (1978).
43. 443 U.S. 193. Justice Brennan delivered the 5-2 opinion of the Court
in which Justices Stewart, White, Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice Black-
mun also filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting
opinion. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger joined. Justices Powell and Stevens did not take part in the decision. Id.
at 195.
44. Id. at 200. He made clear that since the Plan involved voluntary action
by a private employer, there was no state action; therefore, the fourteenth
amendment was not implicated. He also stated that because the Plan was adopted
voluntarily, the Court was "not concerned with what Title VII requires or with
what a court might order to remedy a past proved violation of the Act." Id.
45. Id. at 201-04.
46. See supra note 26 for the text of § 7030).
[Vol. 26:295
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providing that Title VII did not "require" such efforts. 47
Next, while he refused to define the "line of demarcation between
permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans, '"4 8 Justice
Brennan concluded that this Plan was permissible because it was
designed, like Title VII itself, to break down "old patterns of
racial segregation and hierarchy" and to open employment oppor-
tunities for blacks in jobs that traditionally had been closed to
them. 49 Also, the Plan did not unnecessarily trammel the interests
of white employees by requiring the discharge of whites and their
replacement with blacks, 50 nor did it create an absolute bar to the
advancement of whites." Also, the Plan was a temporary measure
52
intended to.eliminate a manifest racial imbalance rather than to
maintain a racial balance. Justice Brennan concluded that the
Plan fell within the "area of discretion left by Title VII to the
private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed
to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated
job categories."
'54
Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's opinion as well as its
judgment. He emphasized that while Kaiser denied prior discrimi-
nation, the employer conceded that its past hiring practices, par-
ticularly the requirement that those hired have five years prior
industrial experience, were subject to question. 5 He argued that
while an employer need not admit prior discrimination before
implementing a plan, he should be required to demonstrate an
"arguable violation" of Title VII and that the implementation of
the voluntary affirmative action plan is a reasonable response to
47. 443 U.S. at 205-08. Justice Brennan maintained that Congress used
the term "require" in § 703(j) to make clear that Title VII was not intended to
force an employer to grant preferential treatment to any group because of a de
facto racial imbalance in the employer's work force. Congress could have said
"require or permit" in § 7036); however, he said, the fact that Congress did not
shows that it did not intend to limit traditional business freedom to such a degree
as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action. Id.
48. Id. at 208.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Half of those trained in each program were white.
52. Id. Justice Brennan, finding that preferential selection of craft trainees
at the Gramercy plant was to end as soon as the percentage of black skilled
craftworkers approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. Id.
at 208-09.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 209.
55. Id. at 210.
[1987
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such arguable violations . 6 He criticized the Court's use of a broader
test of "traditionally segregated" job categories because that test
measures an individual employer's capacity for affirmative action
only in terms of a statistical disparity and not in terms of whether
the employer had engaged in past discriminatory practices.17 Justice
Blackmun also found fault with the Court's test because it permits
an employer to redress discrimination that lies outside the bounds
of Title VIIA8
Regarding his first point, Justice Blackmun conceded that while
the "arguable violation" standard was "conceptionally satisfying" 9,
the standard would have to be set low enough to permit the
employer to prove such a violation without obligating himself to
pay a damages award.6 0 Although a showing of mere disparity
would inevitably satisfy the "arguable violation" standard, actual
liability could not be established on that basis alone. 61 Regarding
the second point, Justice Blackmun pointed out that while the
purposeful discrimination which created the segregated job category
may have predated the Act, the pool of qualified workers reflects
the effects of that discrimination post-Title VII. Refusing to find
that Title VII locks in the effects of pre-Act discrimination, Justice
Blackmun concluded that Title VII does not preclude private em-
ployers from supplying relief for the effects of pre-Act discrimi-
nation for which Title VII provides no remedy.
62
Chief Justice Burger dissented arguing that the "quota" in the
Agreement had the effect of discrimination on the basis of race
against individuals seeking training, that the plurality had misin-
terpreted sections 703(a) and (d) to permit preferences, and that
Congress, not the Court, should make clear that Title VII permits
affirmative action.
63
Justice Rehnquist also dissented arguing that both the language
and the legislative history of Title VII make clear that all forms
56. Id. at 211-15.
57. Id. at 213-14.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 312.
60. Id. at 213-14. He noted that neither Kaiser nor the Union had an
incentive to prove that Kaiser had violated the Act and that no blacks who were
harmed had sued. By showing disparity only, the company is able to avoid
identifying victims of past discrimination and, therefore, avoids claims for back-
pay that would inevitably follow if a plan could only benefit actual victims. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 214-16.
63. Id. at 216-19.
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of racial discrimination in employment, including affirmative ac-
tion, are prohibited. 64 Specifically, Justice Rehnquist argued that
the plain language of section 703(a)(2) prohibits any type of racial
discrimination by any employer or union where the racial classifi-
cation would deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or would otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.
65
Justice Rehnquist also stated that the plain language of section
703(d) prohibits any type of racial discrimination in any training
programs and that section 703(j) prohibits any preferential treat-
ment to correct a racial imbalance in the employer's work force.
66
He concluded by stating that there is "no device more destructive
to the notion of equality than" the quota he saw in Weber.
67
2. Fullilove v. Klutznick ("Fullilove")
68
The equal protection component of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment is not violated by congressional legislation which
provides for a 10% set-aside of contracting grants for minorities.
Congress has the power to enact such legislation provided the set-
aside is narrowly tailored to achieve remedial objectives, includes
safety valves, and is subject to continuing evaluation and reassess-
ment.
In 1977, Congress passed the Public Works Employment Act of
197769 ("1977 Act"), which authorized a four billion dollar appro-
priation for federal grants to state and local governmental entities
for use in local public works projects. 70 The 1977 Act contained a
"minority business enterprise" ("MBE") provision which required
that, absent an administrative waiver, at least ten percent of the
federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used
by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from
businesses owned by minority group members. 71 The legislative
64. Id. at 219-55.
65. Id. at 220.
66. Id. at 226-30.
67. Id. at 254.
68. 448 U.S. 448 (1979).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 6701 et seq. (1982).
70. Id.
71. 448 U.S. at 456-63. Section 103(0(2) of the 1977 Act provides:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall
be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant
gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per cent of the
amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For
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purpose of the ten percent provision was to "begin to redress" the
longstanding existence and maintenance of barriers which had
impaired access by qualified minority enterprises to public con-
tracting opportunities.
72
As required by the 1977 Act, the Secretary of Commerce prom-
ulgated regulations 73 and the Economic Development Administra-
tion issued guidelines 74 ("Guidelines") which required that grantees
and their private prime contractors, to the extent feasible to: (1)
seek out all available, qualified, bona fide MBEs; (2) provide
technical assistance as needed; (3) lower or waive bonding require-
ments where feasible; (4) solicit the aid of the Office of Minority
Business Enterprise, the Small Business Administration, or other
sources for assisting MBEs in obtaining required working capital;
and, (5) give guidance to the MBEs as to the bidding process. 7" The
administrative program recognizes that contracts will be awarded
to bona fide MBEs even though they are not the lowest bidders if
their bids reflect merely attempts to cover costs inflated by the
present effects of prior discrimination.76 The 1977 Act also provides
for handling grantee applications for administrative waiver of the
ten percent MBE requirement on a case-by-case basis if infeasibility
is demonstrated by a showing that, despite affirmative efforts, such
level of participation cannot be achieved without departing from
the program's objectives. 77 The program also provides an admin-
istrative mechanism to ensure that only bona fide MBEs are en-
purposes of this paragraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means a
business at least 50 per cent of which is owned by minority group members or,
in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per cent of the stock of which
is owned by minoirty group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence,
minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. 42 U.S.C. § 6705
(f)(2) (1982).
72. 448 U.S. at 462-67. The Court also reviewed legislative and adminis-
trative programs evidencing Congress' awareness of the objective of, and reasons
for, the enactment of the MBE provisions. Id.
73. 42 Fed. Reg. 27432 (1977), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 35822 (1977);
13 C.F.R. Part 317 (1978).
74. U.S. Dept. Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Local
Public Works Program, Round II, Guidelines For 10% Minority Business Par-
ticipation In LPW Grants (1977); U.S. Dept. Commerce, Economic Development
Administration, EDA Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) Technical Bulletin
(Additional Assistance and Information Available to Grantees and Their Con-
tractors In Meeting the 10% MBE Requirement) (1977).
75. 448 U.S. at 468-72.
76. Id. at 470-72.
77. Id.
[Vol. 26:295
AFFIRMA TIVE A CTION
compassed therein and to prevent unjust participation of minority
firms whose access to public contracting opportunities was not
impaired by the effects of prior discrimination.
7
1
Petitioners, several associations of construction contractors and
subcontractors and a firm engaged in heating and cooling work,
filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. Petitioners
alleged that they had sustained economic injury due to enforcement
of the ten percent MBE requirement and that the MBE provision,
on its face, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the equal protection component of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, and various statutory anti-discrim-
ination provisions, including Title VII. 7 9 The district court upheld
the validity of the MBE program and denied injunctive relief.8 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed."' The United States Supreme Court also affirmed.
2
Chief Justice Burger first made clear that congressional decisions
are accorded great weight even though they raise equal protection
concerns. 3 He maintained that the proper analysis of congressional
enactments was whether the objectives of the legislation are within
the power of Congress and, if so, whether the limited use of racial
and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally
permissible means for achieving those objectives.
8 4
Regarding the scope of Congress' power, the Chief Justice stated
that the 1977 Act was primarily an exercise of Congress' spending
power" and the reach of the spending power is at least as broad
as Congress' regulatory powers; therefore, if Congress, pursuant
to its regulatory powers, could have achieved the objectives of the
MBE program, it had the power to do so under its spending
power .86
78. Id. at 472.
79. Id. at 455.
80. Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. N.Y. 1977).
81. 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978).
82. 448 U.S. 448. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered an opinion in which Justices White and Powell joined. Justice
Powell filed a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stewart filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Stevens also filed
a dissentihg opinion. Id. at 452.
83. Id. at 472.
84. Id. at 473.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 448 U.S. at 473-75.
86. 448 U.S. at 474-75.
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Chief Justice Burger maintained that since Congress has regula-
tory power under both the commerce clause 7 and section five of
the fourteenth amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation"
the equal protection guarantee of the amendment,88 the objectives
of the MBE provisions were within the scope of Congress' spending
power.
89
Chief Justice Burger also concluded that use of racial and ethnic
criteria was a valid means to accomplish this constitutional objective
and that the MBE provision on its face did not violate the equal
protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 90 Justice Burger stated that, in the context of remedial
legislation, Congress was not required to act in a totally "color-
blind" fashion. 91 He also commented that, where the remedy is
limited and properly tailored to cure the effects of prior discrimi-
nation, a sharing of the burden by nonminority innocent parties is
not impermissible. 92 He further stated that the MBE program is
not underinclusive because it does not limit benefits to specified
minority groups93 nor is it overinclusive because it does not grant
benefits to those who are not the victims of prior discrimination.
94
87. Id. at 475-76. The Chief Justice reasoned that there was a rational
basis for Congress to conclude that the subcontracting practices of prime con-
tractors could perpetuate the prevailing impaired access by minority businesses
to public contracting opportunities and that this inequity has an effect on
interstate commerce. Id.
88. Id. at 476-78. He determined that since there existed a historical basis
for concluding that traditional procurement practices, when applied to minority
business, could perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination, the prospective
elimination of such barriers was appropriate to ensure that the minority-owned
businesses were not denied equal opportunity to participate in federal grants. Id.
89. Id. at 479-80.
90. Id. at 480-92.
91. Id. at 482-84.
92. Id. at 484-85.
93. Id. at 485-86. The Court held that there had been no showing that
Congress inadvertently discriminated by excluding from coverage an identifiable
minority group whose members have been victims of discrimination to the same
or greater degree as that suffered by the members of groups encompassed by the
MBE program. Id.
94. Id. at 486-89. Chief Justice Burger noted that the administrative
program provides waiver and exemption procedures to identify and eliminate
from participation MBEs who are not "bona fide" or who attempt to exploit
the remedial aspects of the program by charging an unreasonable price not
attributable to the present effects of past discrimination. Also, grantees can
obtain a waiver if they demonstrate that their best efforts will not achieve or
have not achieved the 10% target for minority firm participation within the
limitations of the program's remedial objectives. Further, he said, the program
is a pilot program, limited in extent and duration and subject to reevaluation
prior to reenactment. Id.
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The Chief Justice concluded by holding that the MBE provision
was constitutional under either "test" articulated in the Bakke
opinions .9
Justice Powell concurred, arguing that the applicable test should
have been the "strict judicial scrutiny" test. 96 He concluded that
the MBE provision was justified under that test as a remedy that
serves the compelling governmental interest in eradicating the con-
tinuing effects of past discrimination and found that no less re-
strictive means was available. 97
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment, arguing that the
proper inquiry for determining the constitutionality of racial clas-
sifications which provide benefits to minorities to remedy the
present effects of past racial discrimination was neither the strict
scrutiny test nor the rational basis test.98 Justice Marshall main-
tained that the applicable test was whether the classifications serve
important'governmental objectives and are substantially related to
the achievment of those objectives.99 He concluded that the ten
percent set-aside met this test, °°therefore, the MBE provision was
constitutional. 101
Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that the equal protection clause
absolutely prohibits invidious discrimination by the government
and that the MBE provision on its face denies the equal protection
of the law.10
2
Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing that the MBE set-aside
creates "monopoly privileges ... for a class of investors defined
solely by racial characteristics." 103 He argued that the class afforded
privileges was too broad since the history of discrimination against
black citizens in America could not justify a grant of privileges to
95. Id. at 490-92.
96. Id. at 495.
97. Id. Justice Powell applied specific criteria in testing hiring remedies
which provided for racial preferences. Those criteria included: (1) the efficacy of
alternative remedies; (2) the planned duration of the remedy; (3) the relationship
between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage
of minority group members in the relevant population or workforce; (4) the
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and, (5) the
effect of the set-aside upon innocent third parties. Id. at 510-11 and 514-17.
98. Id. at 517-519.
99. Id. at 517-21.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 519-22.
102. Id. at 522-32.
103. Id. at 532.
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Eskimos or Indians. 0 4 Justice Stevens argued that even if discrim-
ination could be shown as to all the minorities afforded privileges
under the MBE provision, it did not follow necessarily that each
of those subclasses suffered harm of identical magnitude.
0 5
3. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (" Wygant") 0 6
Absent a showing of prior discrimination, a public employer who
agrees to a collectively bargained for affirmative action plan requir-
ing race-based layoffs violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
Because of racial tension in the community, the Jackson, Mi-
chigan Board of Education ("Board") agreed in 1972 to include a
new layoff provision in its collective bargaining agreement with the
Jackson Education Association. 0 7 The agreement with the teachers'
union provided that if it became necessary to lay off teachers,
those with the most seniority would be retained; however, at no
time would there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid
off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at
the time of the lay off. 08 When layoffs became necessary in 1974,
the Board refused to adhere to the layoff provision and the union,
together with two minority teachers who had been laid off, brought
suit in federal court claiming that the Board's failure to comply
with the layoff provision violated the equal protection clause and
Title VII.109 A Michigan state court eventually held that the con-
104. Id. at 537.
105. Id. at 538 and 554.
106. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
107. Id. at 1844. The Jackson Education Association was the union repre-
senting the teachers. The layoff provision provided:
[Alt no time will there be greater percentage of minority personnel laid off
than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of
the layoff. In no event will the number given notice of possible layoffs be
greater than the number of positions to be eliminated. Id. at 1843.
108. Id. The purpose of the provision was to protect employees who were
members of certain minority groups during periods of layoff. Id. at 1844.
109. Id. Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of Education, ("Jackson ")
(mem. op.) Id. at 1845. Following the trial, the district court sua sponte ruled
that it lacked jurisdiction over the case because there was insufficient evidence
to support a claim of discrimination prior to 1972, the year public employers
became subject to Title VII. Id. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not
fulfilled the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by filing discrimination
charges with the EEOC. Id. After dismissing the federal claims, the district court
refused to exercise pendant juridiction over the state law contract claims. Id.
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tractual provision was binding on the Board. 10 In both 1976 and
1981, non-minority teachers were laid off while minority teachers
with less seniority were retained.11" '
Petitioners, the displaced teachers, brought suit in district court
alleging that the Board's compliance with the layoff provision
violated the equal protection clause and various federal and state
statutes."' On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court dismissed the suit holding that the racial preference in the
layoff provision granted by the Board need not be grounded on a
finding of prior discrimination and was permissible under the equal
protection clause as an attempt to remedy societal discrimination
by providing role models for minority school children." 3 The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 1 4 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari" 5 and reversed."16
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, cautioned that petition-
ers' claim that they were laid off because of their race in violation
of the equal protection clause called for an exacting judicial ex-
amination because racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort were
inherently suspect." 7 He explained that the following two-part
inquiry should be used in an examination of a racial classification:
(1) is the classification justified by a compelling governmental
interest; and, (2) is the means chosen by the state to effectuate its
purpose narrowly tailored to the achievement of that interest." 8
110. Id. Rather than appealing the decision of Jackson I, the plaintiffs
instituted a suit in state court. Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of Education,
No. 77-011484C7 (Jackson County Circuit Court, 1979), ("Jackson II"). Plain-
tiffs raised essentially the same issues presented in Jackson I. The court entered
judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the Board had breached its contract and
that the layoff provision did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. The
court rejected the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated Title VII
and held that it was permissible as an attempt to remedy the effects of societal
discrimination despite its discriminatory effect on nonminority teachers. 106 S.
Ct. at 1845.
Ill. Id. at 1845-46.
112. Id. at 1846.
113. Id.
114. 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984).
115. 471 U.S. 1014 (1985).
116. 106 S. Ct. 1842. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rhenquist joined in that opinion. Justice O'Con-
nor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice
White filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Marshall filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens
filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1846.
117. Id. at 1846 (citing Bakke, supra notes 6 and 12).
118. Id. at 1846.
[1987
DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 26:295
Regarding the first prong of the test, Justice Powell did not
agree with the contention of the respondent-state that the role
model theory, or that societal discrimination in general, was a
sufficient governmental interest to justify a racial classification
because such an interest was not related to remedying the prior
governmental discrimination."1 9 Justice Powell was not persuaded
by the argument that one purpose in adopting the layoff provision
was to remedy prior discriminatory hiring practices because the
record and the district court's findings of fact did not support such
a contention. 120 In this case, since there had been no factual
determination that the employer had a "strong basis in evidence
that remedial action was necessary,' '1 2' and since general societal
discrimination was not a sufficient governmental interest, Justice
Powell held that a compelling governmental interest was not
shown. 122
In relation to the second step of his test, Justice Powell addressed
whether, assuming there was a showing of a sufficient governmental
interest, the means chosen to accomplish this racial classification
119. Id. at 1847 (citing Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977)). In Hazelwood, minority teachers, in a systematic disparate
treatment case, claimed that the school district had discriminated against black
applicant teachers when hiring. The Court held that, in cases involving proof of
discrimination by statistical disparity, the disparities must demonstrate the prior
governmental discrimination. The Court determined that the relevant comparison
was the racial composition of the teachers with the racial compostition of the
qualified public school teacher population (not the student population) in the
relevant labor market. 433 U.S. at 308.
In Wygant, Justice Powell reasoned that the role model theory, which ties the
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of minority students,
had no logical stopping point because it permits discriminatory hiring and layoff
practices long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose. 106 S.
Ct. at 1847. Further, Justice Powell commented that the theory does not neces-
sarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring
practices because a small percentage of black teachers could be justified by a
small percentage of black students. Id. at 1847-48.
120. Id. at 1848. Justice Powell cautioned that the trial court must make a
factual determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence to justify
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary if the remedial program is
challenged in court by nonminority employees. Id.
121. Id. at 1848.
122. Id. at 1849. Justice Powell chastised Justice Marshall for his citation
to non-record documents in support of his dissenting argument that the majority
had assumed too quickly "the absence of a legitimate factual predicate for
affirmative action" and for his failure to define what constitutes a "legitimate
factual predicate." Id. at 1849 n.5. See infra text accompanying notes 137-143.
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was sufficiently narrowly tailored to be deemed constitutional.1 23
He rejected the test of reasonableness used by the court of appeals,
stating that a more stringent standard must be applied to test the
validity of the means chosen by a state to accomplish its race-
conscious purposes. 24 He reasoned that, while a sharing of the
burden by innocent parties is not impermissible, 25 layoffs, as
opposed to hirings, impose the entire burden of achieving racial
equality on particular nonminority individuals so that the Board's
layoff plan was not sufficiently narrowly tailored for purposes of
the equal protection clause.
26
Justice O'Connor wrote separately, concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment. 27 -She stressed that, notwithstanding the
variety of opinions previously issued by the Court, the Justices did
agree that a public employer, consistent with the Constitution, may
undertake an affirmative action program designed to further a
123. 106 S. Ct. at 1850. Justice Powell commented that the term "narrowly
tailored" has acquired a secondary meaning which requires consideration of
whether lawful alternatives and less restrictive means could have been used. He
wrote that the issue is whether a racial classification "fits" with greater precision
than any alternative means. (citing Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 727 n.26 (1974). 106 S. Ct. at 1850 n.6.
124. 106 S. Ct. at 1849.
125. Id. at 1850-51. Justice Powell emphasized that the term "narrowly
tailored" has been interpreted to mean, in part, that the interests of the non-
minorities were not significantly affected. He cited Fullilove where the Court
found that a challenged statute requiring at least 100o of federal public works
funds be used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises was within
the remedial powers of Congress because the actual burden shouldered by non-
minority firms was relatively light. 106 S. Ct. at 1850-51. He also referred to
Weber where the Court approved a hiring program in part because the plan did
not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees"; however, since
Weber involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the validity of the
hiring plan at issue -was not directly relevant to Wygant, where a state-imposed
plan prompting the equal protection claim. Id. at 1851 n.9.
126. Id. at 1852. Justice Powell then compared the burden borne by innocent
individuals in cases involving valid general hiring goals as opposed to layoff
requirements and concluded that hiring goals are not as intrusive as layoffs. Id.
While the hiring goals involve a denial of future employment opportunities,
layoffs are too intrusive as they cause a loss of existing jobs, a disruption of an
employee's settled expectations of the stability and security of seniority, and
impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals.
Id. at 1851-52.
Justice Powell noted that the Court had previously recognized that, a court may,
in an appropriate case, award competitive seniority in order to provide make-
whole relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination. 106 S.
Ct. at 1852 n.12 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976)).
127. 106 S. Ct. at 1852.
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legitimate remedial purpose as long as the means employed to
implement such purpose do not "impose disproportionate harm on
the interests or unnecessarily trammel the rights of innocent indi-
viduals who are directly adversely affected by a plan's racial
preference." 1
28
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the lower courts' conclusion
that the plan could be upheld as a remedy for societal discrimi-
nation, explaining that an evidentiary basis of a remedial purpose
can be shown either by particularized, contemporaneous findings
of discrimination by the public employer or by "information"
which gives public employers a "sufficient basis" for concluding
that remedial afction is necessary. 129 She argued that particularized
findings should not be mandated because of the legal risks attendant
to requiring such findings. 130 She also pointed out that such a
requirement would have the effect of permitting private employers
to voluntarily correct apparent violations of Title VII, while public
employers would be constitutionally forbidden to act in a similar
manner to correct their statutory and constitutional violations. 3 ,
She then concluded that the public employer's "information" could
be demonstrated by a statistical disparity between the qualified
blacks'on a school's teaching staff and the percentage of qualified
minorities in the relevant labor pool, if such statistics would be
sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII pattern or practice
claim by minority teachers. 1
3 2
128. Id. at 1853-54. Justice O'Connor reviewed the opinions of many of
the Justices in Fullilove and Bakke.
129. Id. at 1853.
130. Id. at 1855-56.
131. Id. at 1855. Justice O'Connor explained that if public employers are
required to make particularized findings of past discrimination, they are caught
between the competing hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is
not taken to remedy the employment discrimination and liability to nonminorities
on a reverse discrimination claim if affirmative action is taken. Id.
132. Id. at 1856. She recognized that the nonminority employees must be
given the opportunity to challenge the plan in court by proving that it did not
meet the constitutional standard. While these employees could easily demonstrate
that the purpose and effect of the plan is to impose a race-based classification,
the Board could rebut this argument by introducing statistical proof as evidence
of its remedial purpose. This statistical evidence was sufficient to permit the
court to determine that the Board had a "firm basis" for concluding that remedial
action was appropriate. The nonminority employees retained the ultimate burden
of persuading the court that the Board's evidence did not support an inference
of prior discrimination and, therefore, the plan did not have a remedial purpose
or was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id. at 1856.
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Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the lower courts' applica-
tion of a reasonableness test to evaluate the relationship between
the ends pursued and the means employed, maintaining that the
means had to be "narrowly tailored" to effectuate the remedial
purpose.'33 Here, she said, the petitioners had met their burden of
establishing that this layoff provision was not narrowly tailored to
achieve its asserted remedial purpose because it was keyed to a
hiring goal which was based on the percentage of minorities in the
student body and was designed to maintain levels of minority hiring
that had no relation to remedying employment discrimination.1
3 4
Justice White concurred in the judgment emphasizing that it is
impermissible under the equal protection clause to require discharge
of whites until a suitable percentage of blacks, none of whom had
been shown to be actual victims of any racial discrimination, have
been integrated into a work force.'35 Justice Marshall dissented in
an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun. a6 Charging
that the plurality had erroneously assumed the absence of a legit-
imate factual predicate for affirmative action where both the record
and extra-record materials before the Court suggested such a pred-
icate, Justice Marshall recommended a remand to develop the
record on the issue of past discrimination. 3 7 Justice Marshall also
argued that the only question presented was whether the Consti-
tution prohibited a union and a school board from developing a
collective bargaining agreement that apportioned layoffs between
two racially determined groups as a means of preserving the effects
of an affirmative hiring policy when the constitutionality of the
agreement was unchallenged.,
Justice Marshall then argued that the appropriate constitutional
test, (i.e., whether the measure was legitimately designed to ame-
133. Id. at 1857.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1857-58.
136. Id. at 1858.
137. Id. Justice Marshall referred to voluminous submissions containing
factual material which was not considered by either the district court or the court
of appeals. He then reviewed the information presented in that material. Id. at
1858-60.
138. Id. at 1860-61. He argued that this was not a case where a court order
was entered to achieve racial balance, a white worker was required to give up
his or her job in favor of a black worker, a party was required to suffer the
consequences of an agreement in which it had no role in adopting as in Stotts,
or a party to a collective bargaining agreement had attempted unilaterally to
achieve racial balance by refusing to comply with a contractual, seniority-based
layoff provision. Id. at 1860.
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liorate the present effects of past discrimination) was met in this
case. 3 9 He reasoned that the collective bargaining agreement's
stated purpose of preserving the levels of faculty integration achieved
through an affirmative hiring policy,' 40 when viewed within the
turbulent history of integration efforts in Jackson, was a sufficient
substitute for any finding by a district court that the employer had
a strong basis in evidence to conclude that remedial action was
necessary.' 4' He also stated that in light of the history of the
Agreement, the remedy was constitutionally appropriate because:
(1) the impact of the layoff protection was allocated proportionately
between two racial groups; (2) race, along with seniority, was a
factor used to determine which individuals the school system would
lose; (3) the layoff protection was not designed to increase the
minority representation; and, (4) the layoff provision was tempo-
rary.' 42 Justice Marshall concluded that the means were, therefore,
the least burdensome of all options. 43
Justice Stevens dissented separately, reasoning that a distinction
should be drawn between a decision to exclude a member of a
minority because of his or her skin color and a decision to include
a member of a minority in the school faculty for that reason. He
argued that the appropriate inquiry here was whether the Board's
action advanced the public interest in educating children for the
future and urged that such an interest, and the manner in which
it is pursued, justified any adverse effects on the disadvantaged
group.'" He concluded that this plan was appropriate because the
race conscious layoff policy served a valid public purpose, had
been adopted fairly with full participation of the disadvantaged
139. Id. at 1862.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1863. In recommending remand for a finding of fact on the
issue of discrimination, Justice Marshall stated: "Were I satisfied with the record
before us, I would hold that the state purpose of preserving the integrity of a
valid hiring policy - which in turn sought to achieve diversity and stability for
the benefit of all students - was sufficient, in this case, to satisfy the demands
of the Constitution." Id.
142. Id. at 1865.
143. Id. Justice Marshall concluded that two noteworthy results emerged
from the many views expressed in the case: (1) an affirmative action plan need
not be preceded by a formal finding that the entity seeking to institute that plan
has committed discriminatory acts in the past; and, (2) the Court has left open
whether layoffs may be used as an instrument of remedial action. Id. at 1867
n.7.
144. Id. at 1867.
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individuals and operated within the confines of a narrowly circum-
scribed role.'
45
4. Firefighters v. Stotts ("Stotts"' 146)
A district court may not enjoin an employer from following its bona
fide seniority system when determining which employees will be laid
off absent a showing that the seniority system was adopted with a
discriminatory intent or a determination that such an order is nec-
essary to make whole a proven victim of discrimination.
In 1977, Carl Stotts, a black captain in the Memphis, Tennessee
Fire Department ("Department") filed a class action Title VII
lawsuit on behalf of black firemen against the Department alleging
that it had engaged in a pattern or practice of making hiring and
promotion decisions on the basis of race. 147 Three years later, the
district court approved and entered a consent decree ("the De-
cree"), the stated purpose of which was to remedy the hiring and
promotion practices of the Department with respect to blacks. 48
The City of Memphis ("City") agreed to promote thirteen named
individuals and to give backpay to eighty-one employees. 49 The
City also adopted a long-term goal of increasing the proportion of
minority representation in each job classification in the Department
to approximate the proportion of blacks in the labor force in
Shelby County, Tennessee. 150 By agreeing to the Decree, the City
did not admit violations of any laws, rules or regulations with
respect to the allegations in the complaint.151 The Decree did not
provide for layoffs or reductions in rank or for the award of any
competitive seniority.'1
2
145. Id. at 1869-71.
146. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
147. Id. at 565. The district court certified the case as a class action and
consolidated it with an individual action subsequently filed by a black firefighting
private in the Department who claimed that he had been denied a promotion
because of his race. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 565-66. Like a 1974 consent decree, which settled a case brought
against the City by the United States and which applied city-wide, the Decree
provided for an interim hiring goal of filling 50 percent of the job vacancies in
the Department with qualified black applicants. In addition, the Decree provided
that 20 percent of the promotions in each job classification be given to blacks.
Id. at 566.
151. Id. at 565. The plaintiffs also waived any further relief except to
enforce the decree and the district court retained jurisdiction to do so. Id.
152. Id. at 566.
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In early May, 1981, the City announced that projected budget
deficits required a reduction in non-essential personnel and that
layoffs were to be based on the last-hired, first-fired rule of the
seniority system included in the City's collective bargaining agree-
ment with the firefighters' union ("Union").153 On May 4, 1981,
at Stotts' request, the district court entered a temporary restraining
order forbidding the layoff of any black employee. 54 The court
also permitted the Union, which had not been a party, to inter-
vene. 55
On May 18, the district court granted the preliminary injunc-
tion. 156 Although the layoff policy comported with the City's sen-
iority system and was not adopted with an intent to discriminate,
the court found that the proposed layoffs would have a racially
discriminatory effect and that the seniority system was not bona
fide. 57 The district court ordered that the seniority policy should
not apply insofar as it would decrease the percentage of blacks in
seven employment categories; instead, the court approved a mod-
ified layoff plan.' Layoffs according to this plan resulted in the
release of nonminority employees who had more seniority than
minority employees.15 9
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,'160 conclud-
ing that while the City's seniority system in fact was bona fide,'
6
1
the district court properly modified the 1980 Decree to prevent a
disproportionate effect on minorities resulting from unanticipated
153. Id. The layoff policy also provided that if a senior employee's position
were abolished or eliminated, the employee could "bump down" to a lower
ranking position rather than be laid off. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 567.
157. Id. At this hearing, it appeared that of the 40 persons who would be
laid off, 25 were white and 15 were black; since 1974, 56076 of the employees
hired in the Department had been black; and the percentage of black employees
had increased from 3-4% in 1974 to 11 1/2% in 1980. Id. The court also found
that the Decree did not contemplate. the method to be used for reduction in rank
or lay-off. Id.
158. Id. The court issued two orders. The May 18 order covered lieutenants,
drivers, inspectors and privates. On June 23, three additional classifications were
added and the modified plan was approved. Id.
159. Id. The City laid off twenty-four privates, three of whom were black.
Had the seniority system operated normally, six blacks would have been among
the twenty-four laid off. The number of whites demoted as a result of the order
was not clear from the record. Id. n.2.
160. 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982).
161. Id. at 551 n.6.
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layoffs. 162 The court reasoned that the modification was justified
either under general contract principles 63 or because unforeseen
circumstances had created a hardship for one of the parties to the
1980 Decree and the modification did not conflict with the City's
seniority system. 64 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 65 and
reversed. 
166
Justice White determined1 67 that the district court had exceeded
its powers in entering an injunction that required white employees
to be laid off when the otherwise applicable seniority system would
have called for the layoff of black employees with less seniority.
168
According to the majority opinion, this injunction violated sections
703(h) and 706(g). 69 Justice White reasoned that because there had
not been a finding that the seniority system was adopted with
discriminatory intent or a determination that such a remedy was
necessary to make whole a proven victim of discrimination, there
was no justification for overriding the valid seniority system.
70
Justice White rejected the argument that the district court's
injunction was merely the specific enforcement of a consent decree
162. Id. at 566-67.
163. Id. at 561. The court reasoned that the City contracted to provide a
substantial increase in the number of minorities in supervisory positions and the
layoffs would breach that contract. Id.
164. Id. at 562-63.
165. 462 U.S. 1105 (1983). The Department and the Union filed separate
petitions for certiorari and both were granted. 467 U.S. at 568.
166. 467 U.S. 561. Justice White announced the majority opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined. Justice O'Connor
filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. Justice Blackmun dissented and filed an opinion in which Justice
Brennan and Justice Marshall joined. Id.
167. Id. at 568-73. Justice White first stated that the cases were not moot
because the injunction had not been vacated and was, therefore, still in force.
The court order would require the City to obey the modified consent decree in
making future layoffs and even though the City had restored or offered to restore
all non-minorities to their former positions, those employees had no right to be
made whole for backpay and competitive seniority lost during the layoffs unless
the court order was reversed. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 577. Justice White explained that § 703(h) permits the routine
application of a seniority system absent proof of an intention to discriminate
(citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)). He also explained that
absent a showing that the seniority system was adopted with a discriminatory
purpose or an admission of discrimination by the City, the district court's
injunction was not proper because the layoff plan contravened the bona fide
seniority system. 467 U.S. at 577.
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because that Decree did not speak to layoffs and neither the union
nor the nonminority employees were parties. 7' Justice White also
maintained that any judicial remedy could not violate the provisions
of a bona fide seniority system.172He also rejected the argument
that the district court had inherent authority to set aside the
seniority system because absent an express contractual provision
regarding the award of competitive seniority or a demonstration
that the beneficiaries of the award were actual victims, such an
order was impermissible even if a pattern of discrimination had
been shown at trial. 73 Finally, Justice White refused to decide
whether the City, as a public employer, could have voluntarily
171. Id. at 575-76. Justice White disagreed with the specific performance
approach reasoning that the express terms of the decree did not contemplate such
an injunction because there was no mention of layoffs or of an intention to
depart from the existing seniority system or from the City's arrangements with
the Union in the Decree. Id. at 573-75. Justice White also disagreed that the
injunction was proper because it carried out the purposes of the decree. He
pointed out that the purpose of the Decree was to establish valid hiring and
promotion procedures and not to displace whites during layoffs. Id. at 575.
172. Id. at 575. Further, Justice White emphasized that bona fide seniority
systems are protected by Title VII and that a remedy could not violate that
protection. Id.
173. Id. at 576-78. Justice White disagreed with each of the reasons ad-
vanced by the court of appeals:
First, he refused to accept the "settlement" theory which maintained that
Title VII's strong policy favoring voluntary settlement permitted consent
decrees that encroached on seniority systems. He reasoned that there was
no settlement of any disputed issue by an award of competitive seniority
to any minority and that no layoffs were addressed in the decree. Id. at
578. Second, he disagreed with the argument that since the district court could
have ordered the relief after discrimination had been proved at trial, it had
the same authority to override the seniority provisions to effecutate the
purposes of the decree. He made clear that a district court has the authority
to award competitive seniority to actual victims. See Teamsters, supra at notes
21 and 22 and Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
He emphasized that the actual victim is not automatically entitled to have a
nonminority employee laid off to make room for him (citing Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, (4th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S.
920 (1976)). The court is to balance the equities in such a situation. See
Teamsters, supra 431 U.S. at 371-76. He then held that since none of the
blacks who were protected from layoff were actual victims and no award of
competitive seniority had been given to any of them, the district court had
exceeded the remedy it could have ordered after a pattern of discrimination
had been shown at trial. 467 U.S. at 577-79. Third, he stated that § 706(g)
makes clear that Title VII remedies include make-whole relief for actual
victims but does not preclude preferential treatment for nonvictims. Id.
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adopted this type of affirmative action because, in this case, the
City had not taken such action.1
74
Justice O'Connor concurred, 75 emphasizing that, because there
was no showing of a discriminatory animus in the adoption or
application of the seniority system, as distinguished from mere
discriminatory impact, the district court had no authority to order
the Department to maintain a racial percentage. 76 Like the major-
ity, she concluded that the preliminary injunction was not justified
as a reasonable interpretation of the consent decree since the decree
did not speak to layoffs. 77 Also, the injunction was not justified
as a permissible exercise of the district court's authority to unilat-
erally modify that consent decree because the legitimate expecta-
tions of other employees and applicants were abrogated. 78 She
concluded by stating that the Court properly disapproved of the
preliminary injunction in this case since respondents had no chance
of succeeding on the merits of their claim that the district court
had the authority to maintain a current racial balance or to provide
preferential treatment to blacks.
79
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, finding references by
the plurality and Justice O'Connor to Title VII purely advisory as
the only issue involved in the case was that of the administration
174. Id. at 583.
175. Id. at 584-90. Justice O'Connor first addressed the mootness argument
and agreed with the Court that the case would not be resolved by vacating the
preliminary injunction and remanding with instructions to dismiss. Id. at 584.
She pointed out that since certain black employees have more seniority for
purposes of future job decisions and entitlements than they otherwise would have
under the City's seniority system and since they had not waived their increased
seniority benefits, the issue of the propriety of the injunction still existed. Id. at
585-86.
176. Id. at 587. (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63
(1982)). She reaffirmed that Title VII protects bona fide seniority systems in-
cluding those which have discriminatory effects on minorities. 467 U.S. at 587.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Weber, at 205-207). She then emphasized that a district
court does not have the power to grant preferential treatment to an individual
simply because the group to which he belongs is adversely affected by a bona
fide seniority system. 467 U.S. at 587. Justice O'Connor then cautioned that a
court may use its remedial powers, including its power to modify a consent
decree, only to prevent future violations and to compensate identified victims of
unlawful discrimination. She emphasized that the court should exercise this power
only after balancing the competing interests of discriminatees, innocent employees,
and the employer. Id.
179. Id. at 589-90.
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of a consent decree. 8 0 Justice Stevens concluded that the district
court abused its discretion because the preliminary injunction could
not be justified as a valid construction of the consent decree' and
because there had been no change of circumstances which would
permit modification of that decree.1
2
Justice Blackmun dissented,8 3 arguing that the Court should
have reviewed the preliminary injunction under the abuse of dis-
cretion standard and should not have treated the action as a
permanent injunction.8 4 Instead, Justice Blackmun maintained that
the Court should have decided the case on its merits.'85 He also
argued that the district court had the authority under the consent
decree to issue the preliminary injunction because that order merely
reduced the City's options in meeting its fiscal crisis and did not
require the dismissal of white employees. 1 6 Since the modified
layoff plan was proposed by the City to comply with the preliminary
180. Id. at 590. Justice Stevens stated that if the consent decree justified
the district court's preliminary injunction, that injunction should be upheld
irrespective of whether Title VII would authorize a similar injunction. Id. at 591
n.3.
181. Id. at 591. He noted that there was nothing in the record to justify
the conclusion that the injunction was based on a reasoned construction of the
consent decree. Id.
182. Id. at 592. He explained that the injunction could be justified if it
was based on a likelihood that the district court would modify the decree. Such
action would have been appropriate if respondents had demonstrated the presence
of changed circumstances. However, the only "circumstance" found by the district
court was that the City's proposed layoffs would have an adverse effect on the
level of black employment. This was a circumstance which was known at the
time the consent decree was entered. Id.
183. Id. at 593. Justice Blackmun first argued that there was no justiciable
controversy because the cases were moot. He explained that there was not a
continuing controversy because the preliminary injunction no longer restrained
anyone: the layoffs had ceased and the laid off worker had been rehired. Any
continuing effects from the preliminary injunction could, therefore, be erased by
vacating the court of appeals' judgment. Id. at 593-601.
184. Id. at 593.
185. Id. at 593 and 601-604. He explained that in granting the relief, the
district court was required to consider the respondents' likelihood of success on
the merits, the extent of irreparable harm to the parties, and whether the
injunction would be in the public interest. Id. at 601. He made clear that the
reviewing court's inquiry was only whether, in light of that standard, the issuance
of the injunction constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 601. He then stated
that the Court had viewed these cases as if they involved a permanent injunction,
and had addressed whether the City's proposed layoffs violated the consent
decree. Id. at 602. That issue, however, was never resolved in the district court
and, thus, was not before the Court. Id.
186. Id.
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injunction, Justice Blackmun maintained that if the plan abrogated
any contractual rights of the union, those remained enforceable as
against the City.
18 7
He also argued that, assuming a permanent injunction had been
issued, the district court had authority to enter such an order
because a consent decree is to be construed for enforcement pur-
poses as a contract and respondents had the right to specific
performance of the terms of that decree.'88 Justice Brennan also
maintained that a court of equity has inherent power to modify a
consent decree in light of changed circumstances. 8 9 He disputed
the Court's argument that the only purpose of affirmative action
is to make whole any particular individual, arguing that such action
is also designed to remedy the present class-wide effects of past
discrimination or to prevent similar discrimination in the future. 190
As applied to the instant case, Justice Blackmun urged that an
injunction against layoffs with a disproportionate effect on blacks
was appropriate because the City had engaged in a prior pattern
and practice of discrimination against members of the plaintiff
class which resulted in the lack of seniority of the members of that
class. 191
5. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association and Local 28 Joint Apprenticeship Committee v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("Local 28")92
A district court may order affirmative race-conscious relief for
nonvictims where an employer or labor union has engaged in per-
sistent or egregious discrimination or where necessary to dissipate
the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination. Such an order must
be narrowly tailored to eliminate that discrimination and must not
unnecessarily trammel the interests of nonminority employees.
In 1971, the United States 93 initiated an action under Title VII
and Executive Order 11246 to enjoin petitioners, Local 28 of the
187. Id. at 605 (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757
(1983)).
188. 467 U.S. at 607-10.
189. Id. at 610-21.
190. Id. at 613 and 616-20.
191. Id. at 613-16.
192. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
193. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was substituted as
named plaintiff. Id. at 3026 n.3.
[1987 325
DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 26:295
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association ("Union") 194 and
Local 28 Joint Apprenticeship Committee ("JAC"), 195 from engag-
ing in a pattern and practice of discrimination against black and
Hispanic individuals ("nonwhites").196 Following a trial in 1975,
the district court concluded that petitioners violated Title VII and
state laws by discriminating against nonwhite workers in recruit-
ment, selection, training, and admission to the union. 97 The court
enjoined petitioners from discriminating against nonwhites, engag-
ing in specific selection practices, 98 restricting the size of its mem-
194. The Union represents sheet metal workers employed by contractors in
the New York City metropolitan area. Id. at 3025.
195. The JAC is a management-labor committee which operates a four year
apprenticeship training program designed to teach sheet metal skills. Upon com-
pletion of the program, apprentices become journeyman members of the Union.
Successful completion of the program is the principal means of attaining union
membership. Id.
196. The New York State Commission for Human Rights ("Commission")
intervened to press claims that petitioners had violated municipal fair employment
laws and had frustrated the City's efforts to increase job opportunities for
minorities in the construction industry. 347 F. Supp. 164 (1972).
In 1964, the Commission found that petitioners had systematically excluded all
blacks seeking to enter the sheet metal trade from the Union and the apprentice-
ship program in violation of state law. Petitioners were ordered to cease and
desist their racially discriminatory practices, including admissions on a nepotistic
basis. The New York State Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's findings
and directed petitioners to implement objective standards for selecting apprentices.
State Commission for Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.2d
649 (1964).
After 1964, the Commission commenced other state court proceedings in unsuc-
cessful efforts to end petitioner's discriminatory practices. See State Commission
for Human Rights v. Farrell, 47 Misc. 2d 244, 262 N.Y.S.2d 526, aff'd, 24 A.D.2d
128, 264 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1st Dept. 1965); State Commission for Human Rights v.
Farrell, 52 Misc. 2d 936, 277 N.Y.S.2d 287, aff'd, 27 A.D.2d 327, 278 N.Y.S.2d
982 (1st Dept), aff'd 19 N.Y.2d 974, 281 N.Y.S.2d 251, 228 N.E.2d 691 (1967).
In 1970, the City adopted a plan requiring contractors on its projects to employ
one minority trainee for every four journeyman union members. The Union was
the only construction local which refused to comply with the City's plan. When
the City attempted in 1974 to assign nonwhite trainees to sheet metal contractors
working on municipal construction projects, the Union stopped work. The JAC
also refused to admit nonwhite trainees. The district court directed JAC to admit
six trainees into the apprenticeship program and enjoined the Union from causing
any work stoppage at the affected job sites. Both the Union and JAC subsequently
agreed to a consent order which required JAC to admit up to 40 minorities into
the apprenticehip program by September 1974. JAC stalled compliance with the
order, completing the indenture process only after a threat of contempt. 106 S.
Ct. at 3025-26.
197. 401 F. Supp. 467 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
198. Id. at 482. Those practices included using an entrance examination
and requiring a high-school diploma. These practices had an adverse impact on
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bership in order to deny access to nonwhites, 199 admitting to
membership only white employees from nonunion sheet metal shops
organized by petitioners, 200 and discriminating in favor of white
applicants seeking to transfer from sister locals.
20 1
The court awarded backpay to those nonwhites who could dem-
onstrate that they were discriminatorily excluded from Union mem-
bership and established a twenty-nine percent nonwhite membership
goal based on the percentage of nonwhites in the relevant labor
pool in New York City. 20 2 The district court ordered that the goal
be achieved by July, 1981 and that petitioners implement procedures
designed to achieve this goal under the supervision of a court-
appointed administrator. 20 3 The administrator then proposed, and
the court approved, an affirmative action program which, among
other things, required petitioners to: (1) offer annual, nondiscrim-
inatory journeyman and apprentice examinations; (2) select mem-
bers according to a white-nonwhite ratio to be negotiated by the
parties; (3) conduct extensive recruitment and publicity campaigns
aimed at minorities; (4) secure the adminstrator's consent before
issuing temporary work permits; and, (5) maintain detailed mem-
bership records, including separate records for whites and non-
whites. 
20 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the determination of liability, the membership goal and
the appointment of the administrator and modified the order to
permit the use of the ratio pending implementation of valid, job-
related entrance tests. 20 5 On remand, the district court adopted a
nonwhites and were not related to job performance. The court also enjoined the
Union's practice of paying for special training sessions for members' friends and
relatives who were to take the apprencticeship examination. Id. at 481.
199. Id. at 487-88. The court found that the Union refused to administer
the yearly journeyman's examination and used pensioners and persons from sister
locals across the country as "temporary workers" rather than using persons from
a nonwhite local in New York City. Id. at 485.
200. Id. at 485-86. The court found also that the Union had stubbornly
refused to organize sheet metal workers in the local blowpipe industry because a
large percentage of such workers were nonwhite. Id.
201. Id. at 486-87. The court found that from 1967 through 1972, the Union
had accepted 57 transfers from sister locals all of whom were white. After this
litigation had commenced, the Union accepted its first nonwhite transfers, two
journeymen from Local 400, the predominately nonwhite union. Id.
202. Id. at 491.
203. Id. at 489.
204. 421 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
205. 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976). Certiorari to the Supreme Court was not
sought.
[1987
DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 26:295
revised affirmative action program which incorporated the court
of appeals' requirement and extended the time to meet the twenty-
nine percent membership goal. 20 6 The court of appeals again af-
firmed and petitioners did not seek certiorari from the Supreme
Court .207
In 1982, the district court found petitioners guilty of civil con-
tempt for disobeying the court's earlier orders in almost every
respect and ordered them to pay a $150,000 fine which would be
placed in a special Employment, Training, Education, and Recruit-
ment Fund ("Fund") to be used to increase nonwhite membership
in the Union and its apprenticeship program. 2° In 1983, the district
court again found petitioners in contempt for failing to keep
accurate records and for failing to provide accurate data to the
administrator; the court ordered petitioners to pay for a comput-
erized record-keeping system maintained by outside consultants. 2°9
The district court approved the administrator's proposal for the
Fund, 210 and entered an amended affirmative action program es-
tablishing a 29.230 nonwhite membership goal21' to be met by
August, 1987. The court also abolished the apprenticeship exami-
nation. 2 1 A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed 2 3 the
206. 106 S. Ct. at 3028.
207. 565 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977). A divided panel affirmed the revised
affirmative action plan in its entirety. Id.
208. 106 S. Ct. at 3028. The court found that, in addition to failing to
meet the 29% membership goal, the Union had adopted a policy of underutilizing
the apprenticeship program in order to limit nonwhite membership and employ-
ment oportunities, refused to conduct the publicity campaign, added a job
protection provision to the Union's collective bargaining agreement that favored
older workers and discriminated against nonwhites, issued unauthorizied work
permits to white workers from sister locals, and failed to maintain and submit
the required records and reports. 106 S. Ct. at 3029.
209. Id. at 3029-30.
210. Id. The Fund was used for a variety of purposes, including education,
tutoring, training, counseling and financial assistance. The Fund was to be
financed from the $150,000 fine and a payment of $.02 per hour for each hour
worked by a journeyman or apprentice and was to remain in existence until the
Union achieved its nonwhite membership goal. The district court determined that
this was appropriate. Id. at 3031 and n.14.
211. Id. at 3029. The new goal was based on the labor pool in the area
covered by the Union which had increased in size due to the Union's merger with
five other locals which were predominately composed of white members. Id. at
3029 n.12 and 3030.
212. Id. at 3030. Apprentices were to be selected by a three-member Board
which would pick one minority apprentice for each white apprentice indentured.
Also, to prevent petitioners from underutilizing the apprenticeship program, the
JAC was required to assign one apprentice to Union contractors for every four
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district court's contempt findings and remedies, including the Fund
order and the affirmative action program with modifications.
214
The court also found that the 29.23% nonwhite membership goal
was proper and did not violate Title VII or the Constitution. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 "and affirmed .
2
16
Justice Brennan, in Part II-A of the opinion, concluded that the
district court used the correct statistical evidence of the relevant
labor pool based in New York City in fashioning the twenty-nine
percent goal. 217 He noted that since the goal was later adjusted to
account for the fact that the members of the Union were drawn
from outside of New York City, the original goal would not affect
the obligations of the petitioners under the affimative action pro-
gram.21 1 In Part II-B, Justice Brennan determined that the district
court's finding that petitioner had underutilized the apprenticeship
program was not clearly erroneous even though that court may
have relied in part on incorrect data.
219
In Part III, Justice Brennan ruled that the contempt sanctions
were proper remedies for civil contempt. 220 Since the sanctions
clearly were designed to coerce compliance with the district court's
order rather than to punish petitioners for their contemptuous
conduct, he reasoned that the procedures required for criminal
contempt proceedings were not applicable.
2 2 1
journeymen unless the contractor obtained a written waiver from respondents.
Id.
213. 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985).
214. Id.
215. 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985).
216. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). Justice Brennan announced the 5-4 judgment
of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II,
III, and VI. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens joined in this
opinion. Justice O'Connor joined in Parts 1I-A, III and VI. Justice Brennan also
wrote an opinion with respect to Parts IV, V, and VII in which Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion. Justice
Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger joined.
217. Id. at 3032-33. Justice Brennan noted that petitioners had conceded
that there was no evidence in the record from which their alleged correct
percentage could be derived and that no issue as to the correctness of the 29%
figure was properly before the Court because the goal had been affirmed twice
by the court of appeals and certiorari had not been sought. Id. at 3032.
218. Id. at 3032.
219. Id. at 3032 and n.22.
220. Id. at 3033.
221. Id. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000h (1982).
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In Part IV, Justice Brennan held that the membership goal, the
fund order and other orders which required petitioners to grant
membership preferences to nonwhite nonvictims were not prohibited
by section 706(g). 222 Justice Brennan maintained that such relief is
not prohibited by the plain language of the statute and is permis-
sible where an employer or a labor union has engaged in persistent
or egregious discrimination or where it is necessary to dissipate the
lingering effects of pervasive discrimination. 2 13 Justice Brennan
reasoned that such relief furthers the purposes underlying Title
VII, is consistent with the legislative history of the statute, and
complies with the Court's precedents.
2 24
Justice Brennan explained that the plain language of section
706(g) gives the district court permission to award "other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate". 2 15 This language reflects
Congress' intent to vest broad discretion in a court seeking to
remedy unlawful discrimination. This phrase is also indicative of
the drafters' desire to permit the employer or the union to show
that the plaintiff would not have been admitted even in the absence
of the demonstrated discrimination. 2 6 Justice Brennan concluded
that since neither the membership goal nor the Fund order required
the Union to admit to membership individuals who had been
refused admission for reasons unrelated to discrimination, the plain
language of section 706(g) did not prohibit a court from ordering
the kind of affirmative relief awarded by the district court. 227
Justice Brennan next concluded that his interpretation of the
district court's orders furthered the purposes underlying Title VII.228
In situations where the employer has engaged in particularly long-
222. 106 S. Ct. at 3034-35. For the text of § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g), see supra note 27.
Justice Brennan made clear that § 706(g) did not apply to the benefits
conferred by the Fund. Since the Fund was established in the exercise of
the court's contempt powers, § 706(g) would not necessarily limit the district
court's authority to order petitioners to implement the Fund. 106 S. Ct. at
3034 n.25.
223. Id. at 3035.
224. Id.
225. Id. He ruled that although this sentence prohibits a court from ordering
a union to admit an individual who was "refused admission ... for any reason
other than discrimination on account of race ... " it does not expressly forbid
affirmative race-conscious relief for nonvictims. Id. See the full text supra note
27.
226. 106 S. Ct. at 3035.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 3037.
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standing or egregious discrimination or has formally ceased to
engage in discrimination but has erected informal mechanisms that
obstruct equal employment opportunities, injunctions often prove
useless and race-conscious remedies may be the only effective way
to ensure the full enjoyment of Title VII rights. 229 . He also con-
cluded that, consistent with the relevant legislative history of section
706(g) 230 and section 703(j),2 1 Congress did not intend to prohibit
a court from exercising its remedial authority for past discrimina-
tion.
23 2
Justice Brennan then said that his conclusion was consistent with
contemporaneous interpretations of the EEOC and the Justice
Department, with the legislative history of the amendments to Title
VII, and with the Supreme Court's prior decisions. 233 He concluded
that the district court had authority under section 706(g) to order
race-conscious affirmative action for nonvictims,2 14 but cautioned
that a court should use such measures only when confronted with
an employer or a labor union that has engaged in persistent or
egregious discrimination or when the lingering effects of pervasive
discrimination must be dissipated. 235 Also, a district court should
229. Id. at 3036. In most cases, he said, the court need only order the
employer or union to cease engaging in discriminatory practices and to award
make-whole relief to the individuals victimized by those practices. Id
230. Id. at 3036-37. He explained that § 706 (g) was intended to reassure
opponents of the civil rights bill that a court could not order an employer to
adopt racial quotas or to grant preferential treatment to racial minorities in order
to correct a racially imbalanced work force. Id.
231. Id. at 3036-37. Justice Brennan held that § 7030) was added to make
clear that employers do not have to correct mere imbalances. Id. at 3042-43. He
rejected petitioners' argument that the district court's remedies contravened §
7030), since these remedies require petitioners to grant preferential treatment to
blacks and Hispanics based on race. He reasoned that, in circumstances where
an illegal discriminatory act or practice is established, both the purpose and the
legislative history of § 703(j) supported the conclusion that this provision neither
qualified nor proscribed a court's authority to order relief otherwise appropriate
under § 706(g). Id. at 3044 n.37.
232. Id. at 3044-45.
233. Id. at 3045-47. Justice Brennan explained that in Stotts, the Court
held that since none of the firefighters protected by the district court's order was
a proven victim of illegal discrimination, that court had no authority under §
706(g) to override the bona fide seniority system by an award to individual
nonvictims. Id. at 3049.
234. Id. at 3049. He made clear that the purpose of the remedy was to
dismantle prior patterns of employment discrimination and to prevent discrimi-
nation in the future for a class and to specifically benefit a nonvictim; therefore,
the Union or JAC could chose to admit or to train the persons of their choice.
Id.
235. Id. at 3052.
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tailor an order to fit the nature of the violation it seeks to correct
so that the interests of white employees are not unnecessarily
trammelled.
23 6
In Part V of the opinion, Justice Brennan determined that the
issue of whether the membership goal and the Fund order violated
the equal protection component of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment2 3 7 need not be resolved because the relief ordered
passed the most rigorous test-the government had a compelling
interest in remedying proven past discrimination and the relief was
narrowly tailored to further that interest.
23 8
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, agreed that the district
court's establishment of the numerical goal and the Fund order
was within the remedial authority granted by section 706(g).2 3 9 He
also concluded that neither order violated the equal protection
236. Id. Justice Brennan concluded that the membership goal and the
establishment of the Fund were necessary to remedy the pervasive discrimination
and that the court's flexible application of the membership goal indicated that
this remedy was not being used simply to achieve and maintain racial balance,
but rather as a benchmark against which the court could gauge petitioners' efforts
to remedy past discrimination. He also concluded that the membership goal and
Fund order were temporary and that the membership goal did not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of white employees because the court orders did not operate
as a bar to admission of nonminority persons to the Union. Id.
237. Id. He noted that while the Court consistently had recognized that
government bodies constitutionally may adopt racial classifications as a remedy
for past discrimination, the Court has not agreed on the proper test to be applied
in analyzing the constitutionality of race-conscious remedial measures. Id.
238. Id. at 3052-53. Justice Brennan concluded that there was a proper
showing of prior discrimination that would justify the use of remedial racial
classification. He also concluded that the district court's orders were appropriately
tailored to accomplish this objective: the court had properly considered the
efficacy of alternate remedies and, in light of petitioners' long history of resistance
to official efforts to end their discrimnatory practices, concluded that stronger
measures were necessary; the court had properly devised temporary membership
goals and the Fund as tools for remedying past discrimination; and, the court's
orders had only a marginal impact on the interests of white workers and did not
operate as an absolute bar to the admission of white applicants or to disadvantage
existing Union members at all. Id. at 3053. In Part VI, Justice Brennan held that
the district court's appointment of an administrator with broad powers to super-
vise the Union's compliance with the court's orders was not an unjustifiable
interference with the Union's statutory right to self-governance. He reasoned that
while the administrator had broad powers to oversee petitioners' membership
practices, the Union retained complete control over its other affairs including the
selection of the particular individuals who are to be admitted. He concluded by
holding that any interference by the administrator with membership operations
was necessary to put an end to petitioners' discriminatory ways. Id.
239. Id. at 3054.
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clause. 240 Justice Powell proposed a two-pronged inquiry for as-
sessing a constitutional challenge to a racial classification: (1) is
the racial classification justified by a compelling governmental
interest; and, (2) is the means chosen by the state to effectuate its
purpose narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal. 24' He
determined that the petitioners' past egregious discrimination es-
tablished, without doubt, a compelling governmental interest suf-
ficient to justify the imposition of a racially classified remedy.
242
He then concluded that the Fund order, imposed after petitioners
were held in contempt, was supported not only by the governmental
interest in eradicating petitioners' discrimination, but also by the
societal interest in compliance with the judgments of federal courts.
2 43
Justice Powell also found that the numerical goal2 " comported
with constitutional requirements because, absent authority to set a
goal as a benchmark against which it could measure progress in
eliminating discriminatory practices, the district court may have
been powerless to provide an effective remedy. 245 That the goal was
not permanent and would not be applied as an inflexible quota to
achieve a racial balance along with the fact that the goal was
directly related to the percentage of nonwhites in the relevant work
force and would not substantially burden nonminorities were fac-
tors which influenced Justice Powell's conclusion.
246
Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's affirmance of the
findings of contempt but dissented from its holding with respect
to the propriety of the court-ordered relief.
247
240. Id.
241. Id. at 3054-55.
242. Id. at 3055.
243. Id.
244. Id. In assessing the numerical goal, he relied on five factors to
determine the proper scope of this race-conscious hiring remedy: (1) the efficacy
of alternate remedies; (2) the planned duration of the remedy; (3) the relationship
between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage
of minority group members in the relevant population or the work force; (4) the
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and, (5) the
effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties. Id.
245. Id. at 3056-57.
246. Id. He disagreed with Justice O'Connor's position that the membership
goal was a quota because in order to achieve the goal by its due date (August
1987), the petitioners would have to replace journeymen and apprentices on a
strictly racial basis. When that occurs, petitioners will be free to argue that an
impermissible quota has been imposed; however, based on an examination of
what had occurred in this litigation over the years, the district court had not
enforced the goal in the rigid manner that concerned Justice O'Connor. Id. at
3057 n.4.
247. Id. at 3057.
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She argued that the membership goal operated as a "rigid racial
quota" that could not reasonably be met through "good faith
efforts" by the Union and, therefore, was prohibited by sections
703(j) and 706(g). 248 She argued that section 703(j) is applicable to
section 706(g) and addresses both make-whole and class-wide re-
lief.249 This numerical goal, according to Justice O'Connor, violated
703(j) because it was a quota250 which required racial preferences
because of a racial imbalance. 25' She concluded that the district
court had no authority under section 706(g) to order the member-
ship goal or the Fund as a remedy because both operated as a
quota.
25 2
Justice White dissented, agreeing that section 706(g) does not
bar relief for nonvictims in all circumstances, but arguing that the
remedy operated as a strict racial quota which, due to the economic
doldrums in the construction industry, could require the displace-
ment of nonminority workers by members of the plaintiff class. 253
Justice Rhenquist and Chief Justice Burger also dissented arguing
that section 706(g) precludes the award of racial preferences to
nonvictims at the expense of innocent nonminority workers. 25 4
248. Id.
249. See supra note 26 for the text of § 7030). She quoted the phrase in §
7030): "Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require ... ". 106
S. Ct. at 3058. She also disagreed with the plurality's reading of the legislative
history concerning racial quotas, pointing out that the history reflected a concern
that no substantive liability existed for mere racial imbalance and also that quotas
were not a permissible remedy even for past discrimination, because innocent
nonminorities were harmed. Id. at 3058-59.
250. Id. at 3059. Justice O'Connor explained the difference between a quota
and a goal:
The imposition of a quota is not truly remedial but rather amounts to a
requirement of racial balance in contravention of section 703(j)'s clear
policy against such requirement . . . [a] goal must be intended to serve
merely as a benchmark for measuring compliance with Title VII and
eliminating the lingering effects of past discrimination, rather than as a
rigid numerical requirement that must unconditionally be met on pain of
sanctions.
Id. at 3060.
She argued that the 29.2307o membership figure was not a goal because it required
that the racial composition of the Union's membership mirror that of the relevant
labor pool by August 31, 1987 without regard to variables such as the number
of qualified minority applicants available or the number of apprentices needed.
Id.
251. Id. at 3058-62.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 3062-63.
254. Id. at 3063.
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6. Local 93 Firefighters v. City of Cleveland ("Local 93")"2
A consent decree requiring a public employer to promote its minority
employees who are not actual victims of past discriminatory practices
is not a section 706(g) order and is, therefore, permissible.
In 1980, an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters in
the City of Cleveland ("City"), the Vanguards, brought a class
action lawsuit against the City and its fire department ("Depart-
ment") alleging race and national origin discrimination in violation
of Title VII and the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments.
2 1
6
Specifically, the firefighters claimed that the Department's reliance
on an allegedly discriminatory written examination used to deter-
mine which employees were eligible for promotions and the City's
refusal to administer a new examination after 1975 violated federal
laws.2 17 Prior to this action, Cleveland had unsuccessfully litigated
a number of the underlying factual issues in other lawsuits. 58
Therefore, rather than commence another round of possibly futile
litigation, the City entered into negotiations with the Vanguards.
2 19
While these negotiations were taking place, Local Number 93 of
the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C.L.C.
("Union"), which represented a majority of Cleveland's firefight-
ers, was permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff.
260
The City and Vanguards continued to negotiate alone and sub-
mitted a proposed consent decree to the district court in November,
255. Id. Local 93 is sometimes referred to as Vanguards.
256. 106 S. Ct. at 3066-67.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 3067. In 1972, an organization of black police officers filed an
action alleging that the police department discriminated against minorities in
hiring and promotion. Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.
Ohio 1972). The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and issued an order
enjoining certain hiring and promotion practices and establishing minority hiring
goals. In 1977, these hiring goals were adjusted and promotion goals were
established pursuant to a consent decree.
Similar claims were raised in an action against the fire department and the
district court found unlawful discrimination and entered a consent decree imposing
hiring quotas similar to those ordered in the Shield Club litigation. Headen v.
City of Cleveland, No. C73-330 (N.D. Ohio, Apr. 25, 1975). In 1977, after
additional litigation, the Headen court approved a new plan governing the hiring
procedure in the fire department. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. The Union failed to allege any cause of action or assert any claims
against either the Vanguards or the City but prayed for relief that enjoined the
City from awarding promotions on the basis of competitve examinations. Id. at
3067-68.
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1981.261 The proposal established interim procedures to be imple-
mented over a nine-year period as a two-step temporary remedy 262
for past discrimination in promotions; the city would be required
to (1) reserve a fixed number of already planned promotions for
minorities; 26 and, (2) design minority promotion goals which did
not rely on seniority points264 ("Proposal I").265 Proposal I was
later revised to include more promotions than previously an-
nounced; these revisions permitted the City to add a substantial
number of black leaders to the fire department while still promoting
the same nonminority officers who would have obtained promotions
under the existing challenged promotion system ("Proposal II").266
Proposal II was submitted to the Union's members who voted
overwhelmingly to reject it.267
The Vanguards and the City then submitted another revised
consent decree ("Proposal III"),268 to the district court. Proposal
III resembled Proposal II and provided for the set-aside of certain
promotions for minorities, the establishment of promotional goals,
the reduction of the implementation period from nine to four years
261. Id. at 3068.
262. Id.
263. Id. The promotions reserved were as follows: 16 of 40 planned pro-
motions to Lieutenant; 3 of 20 planned promotions to Captain; 2 of 10 planned
promotions to Battalion Chief; and, 1 of 3 planned promotions to Assistant
Chief. Id.
264. Id. The minority promotion goals were for the ranks of Lieutenant,
Captain, and Battalion Chief. Id.
265. Id. The Union objected that it had not been a party to the negotiations
and the district court judge expressed reservations about the fairness of a decree
where the Union had not participated in the negotiations. Id.
266. Id. at 3068-69. The testimoney revealed that while the proposed consent
decree dealt only with the 40 promotions to Lieutenant already planned by the
City, the Department was actually authorized to make up to 66 offers and the
City could hire 32 rather than 20 Captains and 14 rather than 10 Battalion
Chiefs.
267. Id. at 3069 and n.2.
268. Proposal III, dated January 11, 1983, required the City to immediately
make 66 promotions to Lieutenant, 32 promotions to Captain, 16 promotions to
Battalion Chief and 4 promotions to Assistant Chief. These promotions were to
be based on an examination that had been administered during the litigation.
The 66 initial promotions to Lieutenant were to be split evenly between minority
and nonminority firefighters; however, since only 10 minorities had qualified for
the 52 upper-level positions, this proposed decree provided that all 10 be pro-
moted. This decree further required that two promotional examinations be ad-
minstered in June, 1984 and December, 1985, and that promotions from the lists
produced by these examinations were to be made in accordance with specified
promotional goals that were expressed in terms of percentages that were different
for each rank. Id.
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and the restoration of the use of seniority points as a factor in
ranking candidates for promotion. 269 The district court overruled
the Union's objection 270 and approved Proposal III, finding that
the record reflected a historical pattern of racial discrimination in
promotions in the Department, that the quota system for the short
period of four years was neither unfair nor unreasonable in light
of the history of discrimination, and that Proposal III was more
reasonable and less burdensome than the nine-year plan that had
been proposed originally. 2 1 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed with one judge dissenting. 27 2 The court also main-
tained that such relief was justified by the record and that the
decree was fair and reasonable to nonminority firefighters. 273 The
Stotts decision was determined to be inapplicable to this case.
274
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 275 and affirmed.
27 6
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority first stated that, re-
gardless of whether section 706(g) precludes a court from imposing
certain forms of race-conscious relief after trial, 277 the provision
did not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree. 271 Justice
269. Id.
270. Id. at 3070. The Union merely asserted that the proposed consent
decree was neither wise nor necessary. Id.
271. Id.
272. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.
1985). The court of appeals held that the goals were modest, the plan was short
in duration and did not require the hiring of unqualified minority firefighters or
the discharge of nonminority firefighters, nor did it create an absolute bar to the
advancement of nonminority employees. Id. at 485.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 486. The court of appeals commented that the district court in
Stotts had issued an injunction requiring layoffs over the objection of the City.
That injunction had the direct effect of abrogating a valid seniority system to
the detriment of nonminority Workers. In this case, the court found Stotts
inapplicable because the City had agreed to the Plan and because a consent decree
which guaranteed the integrity of the existing seniority system was involved rather
than an injunction. Id.
275. 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985).
276. 106 S. Ct. at 3072. Justice Brennan announced the 6-3 judgment in an
opinion in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens and O'Connor
joined. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion. Justice Rehnquist also filed a dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger joined. Id.
277. Id. Justice Brennan did note that the Court held in Local 28, announced
the same day as Local 93, that courts may, in appropriate cases, provide relief
under Title VII which benefits individuals who were not the actual victims of a
defendant's discriminatory practices. Id.
278. Id.
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Brennan recognized that both Congress and the EEOC intended
voluntary compliance to be the preferred means of achieving the
objectives of Title VII.279 He then noted that in Weber the Court
made clear that voluntary action by a private employer which
includes reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits individuals
who were not actual victims of discrimination is permissible under
section 703.280 Justice Brennan saw no reason to distinguish between
voluntary action taken outside the context of litigation and vol-
untary action taken in the context of a consent decree, except for
fourteenth amendment considerations applicable to public employ-
ers in both situations.
28 '
Justice Brennan then rejected the Union's argument that since a
consent decree possesses the legal force and character of a judgment
entered after a trial, can be modified by the court in certain
circumstances over the objection of a signatory, and can be en-
forced by citation for contempt of court, it is an "order" pro-
scribed by section 706(g). 21 2 Justice Brennan first stated that while
consent decrees and judgments after litigation bear some of the
same earmarks, consent decrees also closely resemble contracts.
28 3
He then explained that Congress' purpose in enacting section 706(g)
was to protect the managerial perogatives of employers and unions
from undue unilateral interference by the federal courts. 284 Since
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 3073. The majority noted that, unlike Weber, which involved a
private employer, Local 93 involved a public employer whose voluntary actions
are subject to both the fourteenth amendment and § 703 of Title VII. Id.
Justice Brennan carefully delineated the issues the Court was not deciding:
(1) the circumstances, if any, in which voluntary action by a public employer
that is permissible under § 703 would be barred by the fourteenth amendment;
(2) the limits § 703 places on an employer's ability to agree to race-conscious
relief in a voluntary settlement that is not embodied in a consent decree; and, (3)
what showing the employer would be required to make concerning possible prior
discrimination on its part against minorities in order to defeat a challenge by
nonminority employees based on § 703. Id. n.8.
282. Id. at 3073-74.
283. Id. at 3074.
284. Id. (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 15893). Justice Brennan recognized that
Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. The legislative history of
the amendments did not reflect the same concern with preserving the managerial
discretion of governmental employers but also did not indicate that Congress
intended to leave governmental employers with less latitute under Title VII than
had been left to employers in the private sector when Title VII was originally
enacted. 106 S. Ct. at 3075 n.10.
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the principal characteristic of consent decrees is the voluntary and
mutual agreement by the parties without judicial interference, this
purpose is not affected. 285 Justice Brennan then concluded that
because nothing in the legislative history of section 706(g) indicated
that Congress was concerned about judicial enforcement, as op-
posed to judicial creation, of an obligation, a consent decree is
not a prohibited "order".
28 6
Justice Brennan next rejected the Union's argument that, under
Stotts, a district court lacks the power pursuant to section 706(g)
to enforce a consent decree that provides for greater relief than a
court could order. 287 He ruled that, to the extent that the consent
decree is not shown to conflict with section 703, as it had in
Stott, 288 the court is not barred from entering a consent decree
merely because it might lack authority under section 706(g) to do
so after a trial.289
Justice O'Connor concurred, emphasizing that the Court's deci-
sion was a "narrow one" and that nonminority employees remain
free to challenge the validity of race-conscious relief provided in a
consent decree as violative of their rights under section 703 and,
if appropriate, the fourteenth amendment. 290 Even if nonminority
employees do not object the decree, Justice O'Connor cautioned
that a court should not approve a consent decree which on its face
provides for racially preferential treatment that would clearly vio-
late section 703 or the fourteenth amendment. 29' She then empha-
sized that there must be a factual predicate of prior discriminatory
conduct before race-conscious remedies can be permitted. 292 Finally,
285. 106 S. Ct. at 3075-76.
286. Id. at 3076.
287. Id.
288. Id. Justice Brennan distinguished Stotts where the Court held that a
district court could not enter a disputed modification of a consent decree where
the resulting order is inconsistent with § 703(h). Id.
289. Id. at 3077-78. Finally, Justice Brennan did not agree with the Union's
allegation that since it had been permitted to intervene as of right, the consent
decree was invalid because the Union had not consented to it. He made clear
that while an intervenor of right is entitled to present evidence and have its
objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, the
intervenor does not have power to block the decree by withholding its consent
nor does the intervenor have the right to challenge a decree which imposes no
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she cautioned that the issue of whether the race-conscious remedy
in the consent decree was permissible under section 703 or the
fourteenth amendment was left open for resolution on remand.
293
Justice White dissented arguing that the majority erred in limiting
itself to holding that section 706(g), which deals with judicial
remedies for violations of Title VII, has no application to consent
decrees. 294 He argued that the Court should have decided that
consent decrees are not immune from examination under section
706(g) and that, regardless of whether that section applies to
consent decrees, the remedies in such decrees should conform to
the limitations of section 706(g). 295 Justice White explained that
those limitations require a showing that the employer has discrim-
inated within the meaning of section 703, an identification of actual
victims of that discrimination, and a remedy tailored for the victims
of the past discrimination. 296 A remedy may be fashioned for
nonvictims only where there exists particularly egregious conduct
that a district court concludes cannot be cured by injunctive relief
alone.2 97 He concluded that because none of the racially preferred
blacks was shown to have been a victim and none of the whites
who were denied promotion was shown to have been involved in
the discriminatory practices recited in the consent decree, the rem-
edy could not have been awarded by the court and was io more
valid when agreed to by the employer but contested by nonminor-
ities.
291
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, also dissented,
arguing that the consent decree was subject to section 706(g).
299
This dissent reasoned that a court order entered with consent of
the parties was still an "order" of the court and, therefore, was
subject to 706(g).300 The dissent then agreed with Justice White's
conclusion that section 706(g) barred the relief granted by the
district court's issuance of the consent decree because, consistent
293. Id.
294. Id. at 3081.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 3081-82.
298. Id. at 3082.
299. Id. at 3084.
300. Id. He also argued that this consent decree did impair the Union's
rights in the sense that nonminority Union members who would otherwise have
received promotion were obviously injured. Id. He emphasized that the question
of whether an intervenor as of right may block the entry of a consent decree, as
opposed to a judicial decree, was left unresolved by the case. Id. at 3084-85.
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with the limitations of section 706(g), the district court should have
made a finding that the minority firemen who would receive the
promotions were victims of the City's alleged discriminatory policies
and should have awarded relief only to those victims. 01
7. United States v. Philip Paradise, Jr. ("Paradise' ")302
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not
violated when a district court order requires a one-black-for-one
white promotion system as an interim measure in situations where
there has been systematic and total exclusion of blacks from em-
ployment; however, such a remedy must not bar white promotions
or mandate the hiring of unqualified blacks over qualified whites.
In 1972, the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People ("NAACP") brought an action challenging the Ala-
bama Police Department's (the "Department") practice of excluding
blacks from employment in the Department. The district court held
that the Department had systematically excluded blacks from em-
ployment in violation of the fourteenth amendment 303 and ordered
the Department to hire one black trooper for each white trooper
hired until blacks constituted approximately twenty-five percent of
the state trooper force.30 4 The court also enjoined the Department
from engaging in any employment practices that have the effect of
discriminating against any employee or applicant on the basis of
race or color.30 5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the
hiring requirement a0 6 and held that white applicants who had higher
301. Id. at 3085-87.
302. 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
303. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1970). The United
States was joined as a party plaintiff and Phillip Paradise, Jr. intervened on
behalf of a class of black plaintiffs. Paradise, 107 S.Ct. at 1058. The district
court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated, without contradiction, that the
defendants had engaged in a "blatant and continuous pattern and practice of
discrimination in hiring in the ... Department ... both as to troopers and
supporting personnel." Id. at 1058. The district court found that in the thirty-
seven year history of the patrol, no black trooper had ever been hired and the
only blacks ever employed by the Department were nonmerit system laborers. Id.
at 1058.
304. 107 S. Ct. at 1058.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1059. The court of appeals held that the quota relief began the
process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, created by the
past unlawful practices and operated as a temporary remedy until such time as
objective, neutral employment criteria was developed to select public employees
only on the basis of job-related merit. Id.
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eligibility rankings than blacks were not denied due process or
equal protection by the one-for-one hiring order.1
07
In 1974, shortly after the Fifth Circuit's decision, the plaintiffs
sought further relief from the district court after the Department
artificially restricted the size of the trooper force, thereby limiting
the number of the new troopers that were hired and the number
of blacks who could achieve permanent trooper status.10 8 The
district court reaffirmed its 1972 hiring order, enjoining any further
attempts by the Department to delay or frustrate compliance.30 9
In 1977, the plaintiffs returned to district court for supplemental
relief against the Department's lack of neutral promotion prac-
tices. 10 The court approved a "Partial Consent Decree" in which
the Department agreed to develop within one year a procedure for
promotion to corporal which would not have an adverse impact
on blacks and which would comply with the Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures ("Guidelines");"1 ' the Depart-
ment also agreed to develop similar procedures for the other upper
ranks ("1979 Decree").
312
In 1981, over a year and a half after the deadline imposed by
the 1979 Decree, the Department sought approval of its proposed
corporal selection procedure. 313 Both the United States and the
plaintiff class objected to this procedure arguing that it had not
been validated and would be impermissible if it had an adverse
impact on blacks. 1 4 To resolve this dispute, the parties executed
307. United States v. Dothard, 373 F. Supp. 504, 618 (M.D. Ala. 1974),
aff'd sub nom. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). None of the
parties sought certiorari review of the court of appeals' determination that the
5001o hiring quota was constitutional. 107 S. Ct. at 1059 n.5.
308. 107 S. Ct. at 1059. The district court found that the disproportionate
failure to hire blacks as permanent troopers was due to social and official
discrimination, harsher discipline of blacks and preferential treatment of whites
in some aspects of training and testing. Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No.
3561-N (M.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 1975). 107 S. Ct. at 1059.
309. 107 S. Ct. at 1059.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1060. The Uniform Guidelines are designed to "provide a
framework for determining the proper use of tests and other [employee] selection
procedures consistent with federal law." 28 C.F.R. 50.14, Part 1 Section 1 (1978).
312. Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439 (M.D. Ala. 1979). Five days
after approval of the 1979 decree, the Department returned to court seeking
clarification of the 1972 hiring order. The district court rejected the Department's
arguments noting that, as of November 1, 1978, 232 state troopers were employed
by the Department and only whites occupied the higher ranks. Id. at 440-41.




another consent decree which provided: (1) the Department's pro-
posed promotion test for corporals should first be administered to
applicants and the results should be reviewed to determine whether,
under the Guidelines, the test had an adverse impact on blacks; (2)
if the parties failed to agree on a promotion procedure, the court
should develop an appropriate procedure; and, (3) no promotions
should occur until the parties agreed or the court ruled upon the
promotion method to be used ("1981 Decree").' 5 The district court
approved this decree.
3 16
The Department administered the test to 262 applicants, sixty of
whom were black.31 7 Only five blacks were listed in the top half of
the promotional register and the highest ranking black was listed
at eighty. 318 When the Department indicated that it had an imme-
diate need for between eight and ten new corporals and would
elevate between sixteen to twenty individuals before constructing a
new list, the United States objected, arguing that any rank-ordered
use of the list in making promotions would have an adverse impact
on black applicants. 1 9 The United States suggested that the De-
partment submit an alternative proposal that would comply with
both the 1979 and 1981 Decrees.
3 20
Because no proposal was submitted, plaintiffs returned to district
court in 1983 seeking an order enforcing the terms of the 1979 and
1981 Decrees.3 2' The district court found that, in the eleven years
since the litigation began, not one black was promoted to a major,
a captain, a lieutenant, or a sergeant and, of the sixty-six corporals,
only four were black.3 22 The district court held that the test had
an adverse impact on blacks and granted plaintiffs' motion to
enforce both Decrees.3 23 The court also rejected the Department's
315. Id.
316. Id.




321. Id. Although it opposed the one-for-one requirement, the United States
agreed that the Decrees should be enforced, observing that the defendants had
failed to give any reason why promotions should not be made or why no progress
had been made towards remedying the effects of past discrimination. The United
States also claimed that the Department's failure to produce a promotion plan
in compliance with the Decrees suggested a continuing pattern of discrimination.
Id.
322. Id.
323. Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
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proposal to promote four blacks among the fifteen new corporals.124
The district court ordered that the Department submit a plan under
which it would promote at least fifteen qualified candidates to
corporal in a manner that would not have an adverse racial impact
and would ensure that "for a period of time" if qualified black
candidates were available, at least fifty percent of those promoted
to corporal would be black.3 25 If less than twenty-five percent of
those employed in a particular rank were black and the Department
had not developed and implemented a promotion plan without
adverse impact for that rank, the court ordered that fifty percent
of those promoted in the other upper ranks must be black.3 26 The
Department was also ordered to submit a schedule, based on
realistic expectations, for the development of promotion procedures
for all ranks above the entry level.32 7 After the Department pro-
moted eight blacks and eight whites under the court's order and
submitted its proposed promotion procedures for corporal and
sergeant, the district court suspended the fifty percent requirement
for those ranks.
3 28
On appeal by the United States, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the order, concluding that the remedy
was designed to rectify the present effects of past discrimination.32 9
The court concluded that this remedy extended only as far as was
necessary to reverse the egregious and long-standing racial imbal-
ances in the upper ranks of the Department.3 0 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari33" ' and affirmed.33 2
Justice Brennan maintained that under the strict scrutiny standard
the one-for-one race-conscious relief ordered by the district court
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.33 3
Justice Brennan held that the state unquestionably had a compelling
324. Id.
325. Id. at 74-75.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 75.
328. 107 S. Ct. 1053.
329. Paradise v. Prescott, 787 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985).
330. Id.
331. 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
332. 107 S. Ct. 1053. Justice Brennan authored the 6-3 plurality opinion in
which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Powell joined. Justice Powell filed a
concurring opinion and Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia joined. Justice White filed a dissenting statement. Id.
333. Id. at 1064.
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governmental interest in remedying the past and present "pervasive,
systematic, and obstinate discriminatory exclusion of blacks" by
the Department, a state entity, and in furthering society's interest
in compliance with federal court judgments.33 4 He then held that
the one-for-one promotion requirement was narrowly tailored to
serve these purposes; the requirement was, therefore, valid as to
both the initial promotions of corporals and the promotions of
those in the upper ranks.3 35 In arriving at this conclusion, he
reiterated the factors that should be considered by a court in
determining whether a state's race-conscious remedies are appro-
priate in the circumstances: (1) the necessity for the relief and the
effectiveness of alternative remedies; (2) the flexibility and duration
of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; (3) the
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market;
and, (4) the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.
3 3 6
Justice Brennan first concluded that the one-for-one requirement
was necessary to eliminate the effects of the Department's pervasive
discrimination particularly its absolute exclusion of blacks in the
upper ranks.33 7 Such a requirement would also eradicate the ill
effects of the Department's delay in producing such a procedure
and would ensure compliance with the 1979 and 1981 Decrees by
encouraging the implementation of a promotion procedure that
would not have an adverse racial impact.33 8 He then concluded that
the one-for-one requirement was the only proposal in the circum-
stances because the Department's alternative would not have sat-
isfied the governmental interest. 3 9 Justice Brennan also noted that
the alternative of imposing heavy fines and attorneys' fees on the
defendants, an alternative never proposed to the district court, was
unlikely to be effective.
3 40
334. Id. at 1065. Justice Brennan disagreed with the Department's conten-
tion that promotion relief was not justified since the Department was only found
guilty of discrimination in hiring. He reasoned that the Department's discrimi-
natory hiring practices obviously affected the force's upper ranks by precluding
blacks from competing for promotions and that the Department's promotional
procedure was itself discriminatory and caused a total exclusion of blacks in the
upper ranks. Id. at 1065-66.
335. Id. at 1066.
336. Id. at 1067.
337. Id. at 1066.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1066-70.
340. Id. He reasoned that imposition of attorney's fees and costs on the
defendants in the past had not prevented delays. Such action would not have
compensated the plaintiffs for the delays and would not have satisfied the
Department's need to promote 15 immediately. Id. at 1069 and n.24.
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Justice Brennan further concluded that the one-for-one require-
ment was flexible in application at all ranks3 41 and bore a proper
relation to the percentage of nonwhites in the work force. 42 He then
stated that the requirement did not impose an unacceptable burden
on innocent white promotion applicants because (1) it was temporary
and limited; (2) it had been used only once; (3) it merely delayed
and did not bar the promotion of some whites; (4) it did not require
the layoff or discharge of whites; and, (5) it did not require the
promotion of unqualified blacks over qualified whites.
3 43
Justice Powell concurred, identifying five factors, similar to those
used by Justice Brennan, which are relevant in determining whether
an affirmative action remedy is narrowly drawn to achieve its
goal.3" After examining what had occurred in the litigation, he
noted that the one-for-one requirement had not been enforced by
the district court in a rigid manner and did not impose the entire
burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals nor
did it seriously disrupt the lives of innocent individuals.
45
Justice Stevens also concurred in the judgment.3 46 Because the
record disclosed an egregious violation of the equal protection
clause, Justice Stevens concluded that the district court had broad
341. Id. at 1071. The one-for-one requirement was flexible because it applied
only when the Department needed to make promotions, could be waived by the
court if there were no qualified black troopers, and was applicable only until the
Department successfully implemented and validated promotion procedures. Id.
342. Id. at 1071-72. The district court ordered 50% black promotions until
each rank was 25076 black where the relevant labor market was 25% black. The
government contended that the one-for-one 5007o requirement was arbitrary be-
cause it bore no relation to the 2506 minority labor pool; however, the plurality
rejected this argument stating that the district court was not limited to ordering
the promotion of only 25% blacks at any one time and that the temporary 5076
requirement was constitutionally permissible in these circumstances where delay
had occured and use of deadlines had proven ineffective. Id.
343. Id. at 1070-73. Finally, Justice Brennan reaffirmed that district court
judges are accorded substantial respect in the exercise of their broad discretion
to fashion appropriate remedies to cure fourteenth amendment violations because
they have first-hand experience with the parties and are best qualified to judge
whether an alternative remedy, such as an injunction, would be effective in ending
the discrimination. Id. at 1073-74.
344. Id. at 1075. Those factors included: (1) the efficacy of alternative
remedies; (2) the planned duration of the remedy; (3) the relationship between
the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority
group members in the relevant population or work force; (4) the availability of
waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and, (5) the effect of the
remedy on innocent parties. Id.
345. Id. at 1076.
346. Id. at 1077.
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and flexible authority to fashion race-conscious remedies and had
not abused its discretion by ordering the one-for-one requirement.314
He emphasized that in a rare discrimination action where the
governmental unit has been found guilty of discriminatory conduct,
the Supreme Court need only determine whether the district court
abused its discretion; the Court need not employ special and narrow
rules for reviewing the court's decree nor must it use a different
standard of review when a remedial decree employs mathematical
ratios .348
Justice O'Connor dissented.3 49 She agreed that the federal gov-
ernment had a compelling interest in remedying past and present
discrimination by the Department and that the district court un-
questionably had the authority to fashion a remedy designed to
end the Department's history of discrimination.1 0 She disagreed,
however, with the majority's conclusion that the relief adopted was
narrowly tailored and "manifestly necessary" to achieve compliance
with the district court's previous orders.35" ' Justice O'Connor argued
that the one-for-one quota was not justified even if its purpose
was to eradicate the effects of the Department's delay as it exceeded
the percentage of blacks in the relevant labor pool and a compelling
justification had not been shown by the district court. 352 Also,
under a strict scrutiny review, the district court's order did not
"fit with greater precision than any alternative remedy" because
the promotion quota was imposed without consideration of any of
the available alternatives, such as appointing a trustee to develop
promotion procedures or finding the Department in contempt of
court and imposing stiff fines and penalties. 3"
Justice White, in a separate dissent, expressed his agreement with
Justice O'Connor's opinion, stating that the district court had
exceeded its equitable powers in devising a remedy.354
347. Id.
348. Id. at 1077-79.
349. Id. at 1080.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1080-81.
352. Id. at 1081. If a one-for-one promotion plan could be valid because
it speeded up the time within which the 25% goal was to be achieved, Justice
O'Connor queried whether the 100% quota could be defended on the ground
that it merely "determined how quickly the Department progressed toward some
alternate goal." Id. She then stated that the "protection of the rights of non-
minority workers demand that a racial goal not substantially exceed the percentage
of minority group members and the relevant population of the work force absent
compelling justification." Id.
353. Id. at 1081-82.
354. Id. at 1082-83.
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8. Johnson v. Transportation Agency ("Johnson")3"
Where there is a statistical imbalance in a particular job category,
a public employer may voluntarily adopt an affirmative action plan
under which an individual's sex is one factor which is considered in
promotion decisions. Such a plan, however, must meet the Weber
standards.
In 1978, the Santa Clara County Transit District Board ("Board")
adopted an Affirmative Action Plan ("Plan") for the County
Transportation Agency ("Agency"). 35 6 In reviewing the composition
of its work force at the time of the adoption of the Plan, the
Agency noted that women were represented both in the Agency as
a whole and in five of seven of its top job categories far. less than
their proportion of the county labor force.357 The Plan noted that
this underrepresentation of women, in part, reflected the fact that
women traditionally had not been employed in these positions nor
had they been strongly motivated to seek training or employment
in these positions because of limited opportunities in the past.35
In the Plan, the Agency stated that its long-term goal was to
obtain a work force whose composition reflected the percentage of
minorities and women in the local labor force;359 however, the
Agency identified a number of factors, such as low turnover rate
and limited available positions, which might make such a long-
term goal unrealistic.3 60 Because of these factors, the Plan stated
that short range goals might be established and annually adjusted
to serve as a realistic guide for actual employment decisions. 6' The
Plan did not set aside a specific number of positions for minorities
or women; instead, it authorized the consideration of ethnicity or
355. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
356. Id. at 1446.
357. Id. Specifically, while women constituted 36.4% of the area labor
market, women composed only 22.4% of the Agency employees and women
working at the Agency were concentrated largely in EEOC job categories tradi-
tionally held by women. For example, 7607o of the office and clerical workers were
women but less than 10% of the agency officials and administrative professionals
or technicians were women. No woman (before Diana Joyce) held a position in the
skilled craft and road maintenance classes. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 1447.
360. Id. Among other factors listed were the requirement of heavy labor in
some jobs, the limited number of entry positions leading to the skilled craft
classification and the limited number of minorities and women qualified for
positions requiring specialized training and experience. Id.
361. Id.
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sex as a factor when evaluating qualified candidates for jobs in
which members of such groups were poorly represented.
3 62
When the Agency announced a vacancy in 1979 for the promo-
tional postition of road dispatcher, none of the 238 positions in
the Skilled Craft Worker job classification, which included the
dispatcher position, was held by a woman. 36 Twelve employees
applied in 1986 for the promotion, including Diane Joyce and Paul
Johnson, who, along with seven other applicants, were deemed
qualified. 364 Seven of the nine applicants scored above seventy
percent on an interview.165 Johnson and another applicant scored
seventy-five percent while Joyce had the next highest ranked score
with seventy-three percent. 366 Prior to the second interview, Joyce
was concerned that her application would not receive a disinterested
review and contacted the County's Affirmative Action Office (the
"Office").3 67 The Office, in turn, contacted the Agency's Affir-
mative Action Coordinator who recommended to the Director of
the Agency that Joyce be promoted.3 68 After the second interview,
three agency supervisors recommended that Johnson be promoted;
however, the Director, who had the authority to pick any of the
seven persons deemed eligible, promoted Joyce.
3 69
After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Johnson
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, which held: (1) the Agency had violated
Title VII because Johnson was more qualified for the dispatcher
position than Joyce; (2) sex was the determining factor in the
Agency's selection of Joyce for promotion; and, (3) the Agency's
Plan was invalid under the Weber requirement that such a plan be
temporary.3 70 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that the absence of an express termination date in the Plan
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1447-48.
365. Id. Seventy percent was the cutoff for eligibility. Id.
366. Id. at 1448.
367. Id. The record reflected that Joyce had had disagreements with two
of the three members of the second interview panel. One member had been her
first supervisor when she started as a road maintenance worker and the dispute
occurred after Joyce complained that her male co-workers had been given coveralls
and she had not. When her supervisor did not respond, Joyce filed a grievance
and was issued four pair of coveralls the next day. Id. n.5.
368. Id. at 1448.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1449.
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was not dispositive, because the Plan's expressed objective was the
attainment, rather than the maintenance, of a work force mirroring
the labor force in the county.3 71 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari3 72 and affirmed.
3 73
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, held that the deter-
mination of the validity of the Plan was to be made within the
context of the four factors announced in Weber: (1) whether the
purpose of the plan is directed toward correcting a manifest im-
balance in the work force in traditionally segregated job categories;
(2) whether the plan unduly trammels the rights of the formerly
favored class; (3) whether the plan poses an absolute bar to the
advancement of the formerly favored class; and, (4) whether the
plan was limited and temporary.
7 4
Justice Brennan first determined that an employer could consider
the sex of an applicant for a skilled craft job where there existed
a "manifest imbalance" which reflected the underrepresentation of
women in traditionally segregated job categories.37 1 Justice Brennan
stated that a "manifest imbalance ' 3 76 for entry into training pro-
371. 748 F.2d at 1312, modified, 770 F.2d 752 (1985).
372. 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1987).
373. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). Justice Brennan announced the 6-3 judgment
of the Court. Joining in the plurality opinion were Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell and Stevens. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion and Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion as did Justice Scalia who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and by Justice White in Parts I and II. Id. at 1445.
374. Id. at 1449 (citing Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)). Justice Brennan noted
that no constitutional issue was raised or addressed in the litigation below (citing
748 F.2d 1308 n.1 (1984)). He held, however, that where the issue is properly
presented, public employers must justify the adoption and implementation of a
voluntary affirmative action plan under the equal protection clause (citing Wy-
gant, 106 S. Ct at 1848). He disagreed with the dissent's argument that the
obligations of a public employer under Title VII must be identical to its obligations
under the Constitution and that a public employer's adoption of an affirmative
action plan should be governed by Wygant and not Weber. He stressed that the
issue had been resolved in Weber where the Court held that Title VII was enacted
pursuant to the commerce power to regulate purely private decision-making and
was not intended to incorporate the commands of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 107 S. Ct. at 1449-50.
375. Id. at 1452.
376. Id. Justice Brennan also said that where a job requires no special skills
a "manifest imbalance" is determined by comparing the percentage of minorities
or of women working in that unskilled job with the percentage of unskilled
workers in the general population or in the local work force; where the job
requires special training, (i.e., teaching), the percentage of minorities or women
in the employer's trained work force should be compared with the percentage of
trained minorities or women in the local work force. Id.
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grams for the skilled crafts and for promotion to skilled positions
is determined by comparing the percentage of minorities or women
in the employer's skilled work force with the percentage of both
skilled and unskilled minorities in the overall labor force.377
Justice Brennan also maintained that the imbalance need not be
sufficiently gross or direct so as to support a prima facie case of
a pattern or practice claim.178 He concluded that the Agency's
employment decision was permissible because it was made pursuant
to a plan that (1) had a purpose of remedying the underrepresen-
tation of women in traditionally segregated job categories; (2) did
not authorize blind hiring;3 79 and, (3) expressly directed that nu-
merous factors be taken into account when making employment
decisions. 80 Even though a precise short-term goal was not in place
when Joyce was promoted, Justice Brennan concluded that the Plan
was valid because no female had ever been a dispatcher and the
promotion worked toward the long-term goal of mirroring the
presence of women in the labor market.38" '
Justice Brennan then decided that the Plan did not unnecessarily
trammel male employees' rights nor did it create an absolute bar
to male advancement within the Agency. 8 2 He noted that the Plan
was temporary in nature, contained no set-asides for women and
upset no legitimate firmly rooted expectation on Johnson's part,
as the Agency director was authorized to select any of the seven
qualified candidates. 3 The Plan did not mandate that any positions
be "reversed" for women; it did not require the Agency to hire
minimally qualified employees; it contained no quotas;384 and it did
not exclude anyone from having his or her qualifications weighed
against those of other applicants.38 5 Finally, the Plan was temporary
377. Id. Justice Brennan maintained that since skilled minority and women
workers are likely to be as rare outside a particular workplace as inside, a
comparison of only skilled workers would perpetuate the imbalance forever and
forestall training and promotion opportunities proportional with work force share.
Id.
378. Id. at 1454. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24 for a definition
of "systemic disparate treatment" and "adverse impact."
379. 107 S. Ct. at 1454. The Plan recognized that certain skills were
necessary for particular jobs. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1455.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. The Plan expressly stated that its goals should not be construed as
"quotas" that must be met. Id.
385. Id. at 1456.
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in that it was intended to attain, rather than maintain, a represen-
tative work force and its goals were restricted in time and moderate
in execution.116 Justice Brennan concluded that the Agency had
sought to take a moderate, flexible, case-by-case approach to
improve the representation of minorities and women at the Agency
consistent with Title VII.317
Justice Stevens concurred, agreeing that the employer could take
an applicant's sex into account as the purpose of Title VII was not
to absolutely prohibit preferential hiring in favor of minorities but
to protect historically disadvantaged groups against discrimina-
tion.8 Title VII was not intended to restrict management efforts
in that regard." 9 He also stated that the record supported the
conclusion that the employer's desire to create diversity in a cate-
gory of employment that had been almost totally male was a
legitimate purpose. 90
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment stating that the
proper inquiry for evaluating the legality of an affirmative action
plan by a public employer under Title VII is identical to that
required by the equal protection clause. 91 She explained that, while
the employer need not point to any contemporaneous findings of
actual discrimination, there must exist a "firm basis" for the
employer's belief that remedial action was required. 92 Such a basis
can be demonstrated, for both constitutional and Title VII pur-
poses, by a statistical disparity sufficient to support a prima facie
Title VII pattern or practice claim of discrimination brought by
the employee beneficiaries of the affirmative action plan.3 93 She
stated that Wygant, a constitutional case, is consistent with Weber,
a Title VII case, because, in both, affirmative action was permitted
only as a remedial tool to eliminate either actual or apparent
386. Id. at 1457.
387. Id. at 1457-58.
388. Id. at 1459-60.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 1460. He suggested that employers should not focus on the
history of discriminatory practices in its or society's past; instead, employers
should attempt to achieve a racially integrated future which is not based on racial
balancing per se. Id.
391. Id. at 1461.
392. Id. Justice O'Connor maintained that this "firm basis" must be
consistent with the congressional intent to provide some measure of protection
to the interests of the employer's nonminority employees. Id.
393. Id. A "pattern and practice" cause of action is discussed supra note
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discrimination by the employer or the lingering effects of such
discrimination. 94 Justice O'Connor concluded that since women
constituted approximately five percent of the local labor pool of
skilled craftworkers in 1970 and there were no women in the skilled
craft position, the statistical disparity would have been sufficient
to establish a prima facie Title VII case.3 95
Justice White dissented, arguing that, in Weber, the employer's
plan did not violate Title VII because it was designed to remedy
both the employer's and the union's intentional and systematic
exclusion of blacks from certain job categories.3 96 This, according
to Justice White, is what the Court meant by "traditionally seg-
regated jobs."3 97 He charged that the majority interpreted the
Weber requirement to mean nothing more than a manifest imbal-
ance between one identifiable group and another in an employer's
work force and, as such, distorted Title VII. 98 Justice White would
have overruled Weber and the reversed the judgment.3 99
Justice Scalia also dissented, arguing that the Plan had an im-
permissible discriminatory effect on Johnson. 400 Justice Scalia rea-
soned that since the district court found no previous sex
discrimination, the purpose of the Plan could not have been to
remedy past discrimination. 40 1 He then contended that the Court
had disregarded its prior decisions by now holding that racial or
sexual discrimination is permitted under Title VII when such dis-
crimination is intended to overcome societal attitudes which have
limited the entry of persons of a particular race or sex into certain
jobs.
40 2
394. Id. at 1462. She disagreed with Justice Stevens' suggestion that affir-
mative action might be appropriate for any reason that might seem "sensible
from a business or social point of view." Id. at 1461.





400. Id. at 1471.
401. Id. He then charged that the objective of the Plan was not to "replicate
what a lack of discrimination would produce" but to give each protected group
a "governmentally determined 'proper' proportion of each job category" (i.e.,
the Agency's "Platonic ideal of a work force"). Id.
402. Id. at 1469-71. He addressed Justice O'Connor's argument that under
Title VII an employer may discriminate affirmatively if it has a "firm basis" for
believing that it might be guilty of discrimination and if its action is designed to
remedy that suspected prior discrimination. Justice Scalia identified two problems
with his analysis in this case: (1) even assuming the Agency's belief in its prior
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Justice Scalia then argued that Weber should be overruled on
constitutional grounds because it ignored Title VII's clear mandate
that discrimination against any individual because of his race or
sex is illegal.40 3 He also argued that Weber should not be reaffirmed
on the basis of stare decisis considerations.4 0 4 Justice Scalia pre-
dicted that the failure to engage in reverse discrimination would
be economic folly and perhaps a breach of duty to shareholders
or taxpayers where the cost of anticipated Title VII litigation 40 1
and of convincing federal agencies by nonnumerical means that no
discrimination exists exceeds the cost of hiring less capable (though
still minimally capable) workers. 40 6 He concluded by stating that
the irony of the Court's decision is that predominantly unknown,
unaffluent, and unorganized individuals suffer injustice at the
hands of a Court "fond of thinking itself the champion of the
politically impotent. "407
It is apparent that a plurality of the Court believes that: (1)
private and public employers, consistent with sections 703(a) and
703(j), can voluntarily adopt affirmative action plans (Weber) and
(Johnson); (2) a court cannot, consistent with sections 703(h)408 and
706(g), require compliance with a consent decree which provides
for affirmative action by overriding a bona fide seniority system
(Stotts); (3) a court can, consistent with section 706(g), approve a
consent decree which provides for affirmative action (Local 93);
and, (4) a court which finds the employer guilty of egregious
discrimination, the Plan was not designed to remedy prior discrimination but to
establish a sexually representative work force; and, (2) an absolute zero is not
determinative of a belief on the employer's part that it discriminated because it may
be aware of particular reasons that account for the zero. Id. at 1470 n.4.
403. Id. at 1472.
404. Id. at 1473. He argued that the Court has applied the doctrine of stare
decisis to civil rights statutes less rigorously than to other laws and that Weber
was a dramatic departure from the Court's prior Title VII precedents. Since
Weber was decided only seven years previously and had provided little guidance
to persons seeking to conform their conduct to the law, stare decisis considerations
were not compelling. Id.
405. Id. at 1475. Justice Scalia further argued that even if the employer is
confident of prevailing in a discrimination lawsuit, the expense and adverse
publicity of a trial must be contemplated. The extent of the imbalance and the
"job relatedness" of the employer's selection criteria are questions of fact which
must be proven in court in order to rebut a prima facie case consisting only of
a showing that the selection process chooses those from the protected class at a
"significantly lesser rate than their counterparts". Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 1476.
408. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Section 703(h) is set forth supra note 17.
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discrimination can order remedial affirmative action relief consis-
tent with section 706(g) (Local 28). The Court has also determined
that: (1) a congressional statute providing for set-asides is consti-
tutional (Fullilove); (2) a public employer cannot constitutionally
agree to affirmative action which requires whites to be laid off
without proof that the employer was guilty of prior discrimination
and that this remedy is narrowly tailored (Wygant); and, (3) a court
can constitutionally require, an interim, one-for-one promotion re-
quirement after finding systematic discrimination (Paradise).
II. THE SYNONYMOUS TEST
40 9
When any type of affirmative action plan is challenged, the
controlling test for both Title VII and equal protection actions
involves the identical two-pronged inquiry: (1) is there a sufficient
demonstration of intentional discrimination by the employer4 10 and,
(2) is the remedy narrowly tailored, in light of other alternatives,
to eliminate that discrimination. The employer can meet the dis-
crimination prong of this test by producing evidence, for all but
the judicial remedy, 411 of a firm basis for concluding that the
employer has intentionally engaged in past or present discrimination
or used policies or practices which have left uncorrected past
discrimination or which have a present discriminatory effect ("fac-
409. Various authors have discussed related issues not specifically addressed
in this article. For example, one author argues effectively that the framers of the
fourteenth amendment could not have intended it to generally prohibit all affir-
mative action for blacks or other disadvantaged groups. Schnapper, Affirmative
Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VIRG. L.
REV. 753 (1985). Another author focuses on the conflict between nondiscrimi-
nation and integration as interpreted by the courts and as viewed in terms of an
underlying philosophical theory of justice. Farrell, Intergating by Discriminating:
Affirmative Action that Disadvantages Minorities, 62 U. DETR. L. REv. 553
(1985). A third author argues that the traditional conceptions of equality and
discrimination do not serve the purposes of Title VII and that the proper analytic
framework should be based on an "access principle." Friedman, Redefining
Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action Under Title VII: The Access
Principle, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 41 (1986).
410. The term "employer" includes labor organizations, employment agen-
cies and joint labor-management committees. The term "employee" includes
applicants, trainees, and any other person protected by Title VII.
411. Section 706(g) requires that the court find the employer guilty of
discrimination before it may award relief under that section. Except in adverse
impact cases, no judicial remedy can be awarded unless the employer or union
has been found guilty, in accordance with rules of evidence, of intentional
discrimination in violation of § 703.
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tual basis" or "discrimination test"). This evidence does not re-
quire an employer admission of discrimination and the employer
need not identify the victims of that discrimination. The remedy
prong can be met only if the relief is designed to eliminate the
employer's identified discrimination, is temporary, provides for
goals that have "safety valves," and does not impinge on the
employee's contractual or Title VII rights or expectation interests
("remedy test").
Part A of the following discussion summarizes the holdings of
the previously discussed cases. Part B analyzes both the discrimi-
nation and the remedy tests in the context of voluntary affirmative
action, consent decrees and judicial remedies.
A. Case Holdings
1. Voluntary Affirmative Action: Weber, Wygant, and Johnson
a. Weber4 12
The Court held, in a 5-2 decision, that sections 703 (a), (d), and
(j) are not violated when private sector employers and unions take
affirmative race-conscious steps designed to eliminate manifest ra-
cial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories as long as
such action does not trammel unnecessarily the interests of white
employees by requiring the discharge of white workers and their
replacement with new black hirees. The affirmative race-conscious
action in this case did not create an absolute bar to the advancement
of white employees because the action was a temporary measure
which was intended to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance not
maintain a racial balance.
b. Wygant4 3
The Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment was violated when a public employer
agreed to a collectively bargained for affirmative action plan re-
quiring race-based layoffs and there was neither a showing of prior
discrimination by the employer nor a showing that this remedy was
412. See the discussion supra at notes 30-67 and the accompanying text.
413. See the discussion supra notes 106-145 and the accompanying text.
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narrowly tailored and the least intrusive means of accomplishing
the employer's stated goal.
c. Johnson
414
The Court held, in a 6-3 decision, that section 703(a) was not
violated by a public employer who voluntarily adopted an affir-
mative action plan under which an individual's sex could be taken
into account as one factor in making promotion decisions where
there was a manifest statistical imbalance in the relevant job
category and where the remedy meets the Weber standards.
2. Consent Decrees and Injunctions: Stotts and Local 93
a. Stotts4l5
The Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that sections 703(h) and 706(g)
were violated when a district court enjoined a city from following
its bona fide seniority system to determine who was to be laid off
as a result of a budgetary shortfall. Absent either a finding that
the seniority system was adopted with discriminatory intent or a
determination that such a remedy was necessary to make whole a
proven victim of discrimination, the district court's order was not
justified as a way to enforce the terms of an agreed upon consent
decree or as part of the court's inherent authority to modify the
decree.
b. Local 93416
The Court held, in a 6-3 decision, that section 706(g) was not
violated when a public employer entered into a consent decree
requiring promotions for its minority firefighters who were not the
actual victims of past discriminatory practices because the consent
decree was not a 706(g) order and did not violate any other
provision of Title VII.
3. Judicial Remedies: Local 28 and Paradise
a. Local 28417
The Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that section 706(g) was not
violated when a district court ordered affirmative race-conscious
414. See the discussion supra notes 355-407 and the accompanying text.
415. See the discussion supra notes 146-191 and the accompanying text.
416. See the discussion supra notes 255-301 and the accompanying text.
417. See the discussion supra notes 192-254 and the accompanying text.
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relief by a certain date for nonvictims where an employer or a
labor union had engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination.
The Court determined that such relief was also mandated where
necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimi-
nation as long as the remedy was narrowly tailored to eliminate
that discrimination and did not trammel unnecessarily the interests
of nonminority employees.
b. Paradise48
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the equal protection
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment was not violated when a
district court awarded relief requiring a one-black-for-one-white
promotion procedure as an interim measure for state trooper pro-
motions in a public safety department where there had been sys-
tematic and total exclusion of blacks from employment as state
troopers in that department and where the remedy was narrowly
tailored to address that discrimination.
4. Legislation: Fullilove
a. Fullilove*19
The Court held, in a 6-3 decision, that the equal protection
provision of the due process clause of the fifth amendment is not
violated when Congress enacts legislation providing for a ten per-
cent set-aside of contracting grants for minorities. Congress has
the power to enact such legislation as long as constitutionally
permissible means, are employed (i.e., the program narrowly tai-
lored to achieve Congress' remedial objectives, it provides for safety
valves, and it is subject to continuing evaluation and reassessment).
B. The Showing of Discrimination
1. The Enunciated Tests
a. Voluntary Plans
1.) Equal Protection
Appropriate voluntary affirmative action remedies developed to
rectify race discrimination are not upheld unless there is a showing
418. See the discussion supra notes 302-354 and the accompanying text.
419. See the discussion supra notes 68-105 and the accompanying text.
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that the racial classification is justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest. 420 While a factual determination that the employer
had a "strong basis in evidence that remedial action was necessary ' 421
can be a sufficient showing for equal protection purposes, the role
model theory 422 and general societal discrimination are not sufficient
governmental interests to justify a racial classification because these
reasons are unrelated to remedying prior intentional governmental
discrimination .423
Justice O'Connor argues that a remedial purpose can be shown
by particularized, contemporaneous findings of discrimination by
the public employer or by "information" which gives public em-
ployers a "sufficient basis" for concluding that remedial action is
necessary.424 The public employer's "information" can be demon-
strated by a showing of statistical disparity between the percentage
of minorities in the employer's work force and the percentage of
qualified minorities in the relevant labor pool if such statistics
would be sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII pattern or
practice claim by minority plaintiffs. 425
420. The strict scrutiny test, used for a racial classification, asks whether
the remedy is narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental interest of
eliminating race discrimination. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064. The test usually
employed for sex is less restrictive: whether the remedy is substantially related to
the important governmental interest of eliminating sex discrimination. Personnel
Adminstrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
421. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848.
422. Id. at 1847-49. In Wygant, Justice Powell reasoned that the role model
theory, which ties the required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage
of minority students, had no logical stopping point because it permits discrimi-
natory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required by any legitimate
remedial purpose. Id. at 1847. Further, Justice Powell commented that the theory
does not necessarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory
hiring practices because a small percentage of black teachers could be justified
by a small percentage of black students. Id. at 1847-48.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 1855-56. Justice O'Connor argued that particularized findings
should not be mandated because of the legal risks attendant to requiring such
findings as well as the anomalous result that public employers would be consti-
tutionally forbidden to correct their statutory and constitutional violations using
the same methods that private employers can voluntarily employ to correct Title
VII violations. Id. Also, she explained, if public employers are required to make
particularized findings of past discrimination, they are caught between the com-
peting hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is not taken to
remedy the admitted employment discrimination and liability to nonminorities on
a reverse discrimination claim if affirmative action is taken. Id.
425. Id. at 1856.
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2.) Title VII
Appropriate voluntary affirmative action remedies are justified
by the existence of a "manifest imbalance" that reflects an under-
representation of blacks or women in traditionally segregated job
categories. 426 For entry into training programs for the skilled crafts
and for promotion to skilled positions, a "manifest imbalance" is
determined by comparing the percentage of minorities or women
in the employer's skilled work force with the percentage of both
skilled and unskilled minorities in the overall labor force. 427 Al-
though the imbalance must be "manifest,". it need not be as gross
or direct as is necessary to support a prima facie case of a pattern
or practice claim.
428
• Justice O'Connor argues that, while no contemporaneous find-
ings of actual discrimination need be shown, the employer must
have had a "firm basis" for believing that remedial action was
required. 429 Such "basis" can be demonstrated, for both constitu-
tional and Title VII purposes, by a statistical disparity sufficient
to support a prima facie pattern or practice claim of discrimination
under Title VII.430 She insists that Wygant, 43I a constitutional case,
is consistent with Weber,432 a Title VII case, because, in both,
affirmative action was permitted only as a remedial tool to eliminate
actual or apparent employer discrimination or the lingering effects
of such discrimination. 411
b. Consent Decrees; Injunctions4
34
1.) Title VII
Both Stotts4"3 and Local 93436 involved factual situations where
a city was found to have engaged in prior, systematic intentional
426. Weber, 443 U.S at 209-10 and Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452-54.
427. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452. See also supra note 377.
428. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1454. All of the dissenters argued that, after
Johnson, Weber requires nothing more than a showing of a manifest imbalance
between one identifiable group and another in an employer's work force and, as
such, distorts Title VII; therefore, Weber should be overruled on constitutional
grounds. Id. at 1465-75.
429. Id. at 1462.
430. Id.
431. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
432. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
433. 107 S. Ct. at 1462.
434. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a case charging that the
court's enforcement of a consent decree is a violation of the equal protection
clause.
435. 467 U.S. at 565-66.
436. 106 S. Ct. at 3067.
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discrimination which had not been eliminated by prior consent
decrees. The Court saw no reason to distinguish between voluntary
action taken outside the context of the litigation and voluntary
action taken in the context of a consent decree; however, there
were fourteenth amendment considerations applicable to public
employers in both situations.417 In Local 93,438 Justice O'Connor
emphasized that before race-conscious remedies can be permitted,
there must be a factual predicate of prior discriminatory conduct.
c. Judicial Remedies
1.) Equal Protection
The state has a compelling governmental interest in remedying
both the past and present pervasive, systematic, and obstinate
discriminatory exclusion of blacks by a state entity and in furthering
society's interest in compliance with federal court judgments.
43 9
2.) Title VII
Under section 706(g), a judicial finding of intentional individual
or systemic disparate treatment can be the predicate of any affir-
mative action relief." °
2. Discussion
In the context of voluntary plans or consent decrees, the cases
give little direction as to the requisite showing of discrimination"'
which would provide a reasonable basis for the employer to con-
clude that affirmative action is appropriate." 2 As the composition
of the Court changes, there is serious question as to whether
discrimination in Title VII actions can be shown by a manifest
statistical imbalance without some showing of the employer's actual
437. Id. at 3073.
438. Id. at 3075.
439. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1065.
440. Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3035.
441. Indeed, although the language of Title VII refers many times to
"discrimination," Title VII does not define the term. Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
442. The Court viewed consent decrees as more like "agreements" than
court orders subject to the § 706(g) requirement of intentional engagement in
unlawful employment practies. Local 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3073.
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or apparent discrimination. 443 For equal protection purposes, a
showing of a manifest statistical imbalance, without a showing of
the employer's actual or apparent discrimination, will not constitute
a sufficient showing of discrimination. 444 The critical question,
therefore, is what evidence must be shown to provide a reasonable
basis for the employer's conclusion that affirmative action is ap-
propriate in the context of voluntary affirmative action or a consent
decree?
a. Factual Predicate of Employer's Intentional Discrimination
The fundamental focus, for both equal protection and Title VII
affirmative action inquiries, should be whether there exists some
evidence of actual past or present discrimination by the employer,
not by society at large. This focus is consistent with the Court's
requirement that the affirmative action remedy be designed to
eliminate an employer's present discrimination or to correct an
employer's past discrimination. This focus also serves as the correct
backdrop for the employer's determination of whether there exists
a reasonable basis for determining that affirmative action is ap-
propriate and as the correct framework within which a remedy that
eliminates that discrimination is narrowly tailored in light of the
circumstances.
The necessary factual basis for a voluntary plan should be a
reasonable employer self-analysis which demonstrates one or more
employment practices that may leave uncorrected the effects of
prior discrimination or that may result in disparate treatment of
members of a protected class. This analysis need not reveal a
violation of Title VII or require an admission by the employer of
such a violation. It is suggested that the self-analysis should pattern
the guide promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in its Regulation 1608.4(1)-(c), Guidelines On Affir-
443. The cases reflect fundamental differences among the Justices as to the
requisite showing of discrimination. For example, Justice O'Connor consistently
emphasizes that the record must reflect a "firm basis" or "legitimate factual
predicate" of the employer's intentional discrimination. Justices Blackmun, Bren-
nan, and Marshall maintain that discrimination is shown under Title VII if
statistics indicate a "manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job catego-
ries." Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and White require a showing of actual, inten-
tional discrimination and only permit a remedy for identified victims.
444. Washington v. Davis, supra note 24.
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mative Action, 445 without requiring proof of discrimination by a
demonstration of adverse impact. Following these guidelines would
establish a standard for determining whether a factual basis of
discrimination may exist for both Title VII and equal protection
purposes. Such a standard is also familiar to the public and, in
the Title VII context, provides for a defense to challengers of
plans."
6
445. Guidelines On Affirmative Action, 44 Fed. Reg. 4422 (1979), 29 C.F.R.
§ 1608.
§ 1608.4 Establishing affirmative action plans.
An affirmative action plan or program ... shall contain three elememts:
reasonable self analysis; a reaonable basis for concluding action is appropriate;
and reasonable action.
(a) Reasonable self analysis. The objective of a self analysis is to determine
whether employment practices do, or tend to, exclude, disadvantage, restrict, or
result in adverse impact or disparate treatment of previously excluded or restricted
groups or leave uncorrected the effects of prior discrimination, and if so, to
attempt to determine why. There is not mandatory method of conduction a self
analysis. The employer may utilize techniques used in order to comply with
Executive Order No. 11246., as amended, and ... (Revised Order 4), or related
orders issued by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance programs or its
authorized agencies, or may use an analysis similar to that required under other
federal, state, or locals laws or regulations prohibiting employment discrimination.
In conducting a self analysis, the employer ... should be concerned with the
effect on its employment practices of circumstances which may be the result of
discrimination by other persons or institutions. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
(b) Reasonable basis. If the self analysis shows that one or more employment
practices: (1) Have or tend to have an adverse effect on employment opportunities
of members of previously excluded groups, or groups whose employment or
promotional opportunities have been artificially limited, (2) leave uncorrected
the effect of prior discrimination, or (3) result in disparate treatment, the person
making the self analysis has a reasonable basis for concluding that action is
appropriate. It is not necessary that the self analysis establish a violation of Title
VII. This reasonable basis exists without any admission or formal finding that
the person has violated Title VII, and without regard to whether there exists
arguable defenses to a Title VII action.
(c) Reasonable action. The action taken pursuant to an affirmative action
plan or program must be reasonable in relation to the problems disclosed by the
self analysis. Such reasonable action may include goals and timetables or other
appropriate employment tools which recognize the race, sex, or national origin
of applicants or employees. It may include the adoption of practices which will
eliminate the actual or potential adverse impact, disparate treatment or effect or
(sic) past discrimination by providing opportunities for members of groups which
have been excluded, regardless of whether the persons benefited were themselves
the victims of prior policies or procedures which produced the adverse impact or
disparate treatment or which perpetuated past discrimination.
446. § 1608.10(b), 29 C.F.R. § 1608.10(b), provides:
(b) Reliance on these guidelines. If a respondent asserts that the action taken
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b. A Showing of Adverse Impact is Not Sufficient to Establish
a Factual Basis of Discrimination
Although it is relevant, the concept of adverse impact has no
place in demonstrating discrimination for either equal protection
or Title VII purposes where affirmative action is the remedy. 447 As
explained in Part One, absent some evidence of the employer's
intentional discrimination, statistics alone are not a dispositive
demonstration of intentional discrimination in equal protection
cases. 448 Proof of discrimination by statistics alone in Title VII
systemic-disparate-treatment (i.e., pattern or practice) challenges is
was pursuant to and in accordance with a plan or program which was adopted
or implemented in good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance upon those
guidelines, and the self analysis and plan are in writing, the Commission will
determine whether such assertion is true. If the Commission so finds, it will so
state in the determination of no reasonable cause and will advise the respondent
that:
(1) The Commission has found that the respondent is entitled to the protection
of section 713(b)(1) of Title VII; and
(2) That the determination is itself an additional written interpretation or
opinion of the Commission pursuant to section 713(b)(1).
Section 713(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(l), provides:
(b) In any action or proceeding based on any alleged unlawful employment
practice, no person shall be subject to any liability or punishment of or on
account of (1) the commission by such person of an unlawful employment practice
if he pleads and proves that the act or reliance on any written interpretation or
opinion of the Commission ... . Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar to
the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that (A) after such act or omission,
such interpretation or opinion is modified or rescinded or is determined by
judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect....
A related issue is the discoverability of the factual basis for determining that
affirmative action may be appropriate. Employers defending such plans have
argued, in appropriate circumstances, that the analysis underlying the determi-
nation to adopt such a plan is not discoverable because it constitutes "work-
product" performed in anticipation of litigation or is protected from discovery
because of the "self-critical analysis" privilege. The Self-critical Analysis Privilege
and Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 MICH. L. REV.
405 (1984). In this article, the author states that plaintiffs bringing Title VII
actions are usually interested in either the statistics or the self-analysis of company
policy contained in affimative action plans and often attempt to obtain this
information from the defendant employer during discovery or through the Free-
dom of Information Act. Id. at 406-07. The author suggests that plaintiffs should
have access to the plans in discovery and that the self-evaluative privilege should
not be applied but that the plans should be produced under a protective order.
447. An aggrieved party would still have a cause of action under § 703(a)(2).
The employer should be enjoined from using the practice causing the impact, but
affirmative action is not an appropriate remedy because actual or apparent
intentional discrimination is not demonstrated.
448. See Davis, supra notes 23 and 24.
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permitted only if the record contains testimony of actual victims
of the employer's discrimination. 4 9 Since adverse impact cannot
prove intentional employer discrimination, a remedy based on those
statistics cannot be addressed to eradicating the employer's inten-
tional discrimination.
In a potential adverse impact case, a diligent search will usually
produce identifiable victims so that the plaintiffs can bring a
systemic-disparate-treatment case rather that an adverse impact
case. Likewise, to show past discrimination, the employer should
look beyond the mere statistics and identify possible victims without
incurring liability to any one actual victim. This is consistent with
both the purposes of affirmative action and with the Court's
decisions in the voluntary affirmative action cases- Weber and
Johnson-in the consent decree case- Local 93-in all Title VII
cases where the affirmative action remedy was approved, and in
Wygant, an equal protection case where the affirmative action
remedy was not approved.
In Weber, there was statistical proof that less than two percent
of the employer's work force was black even though blacks rep-
resented thirty-nine percent available work force. 450 There was also
evidence that the employer knowingly hired from the all-white
Union. 45 In Johnson, there was statistical proof that women were
not represented in the relevant work force, but constituted ten
percent of the available work force. 4 2 While a majority of the
Court in both Weber and Johnson found discrimination on the
basis of a manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job
category, the statistical basis in both cases reflected that the em-
ployer employed members of the protected class at or very near
the "inexorable zero," 453 therefore, intentional discrimination could
be implied. Also, the concurrences in both cases stated that the
record supported a finding of an "arguable violation ' 45 4 or a "firm
basis ' 455 that intentional discrimination existed.
449. A "pattern or practice" case is discussed supra note 21.
450. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99.
451. Id.
452. Id. There was also evidence that Joyce had been a victim of discrim-
ination in the past. Id.
453. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The Court held that
"the company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination came not from
a misuse of statistics but from the 'inexorable zero."' See supra notes 21 and 22
and accompanying text.
454. Weber, 443 U.S. at 211-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The employer's
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In Local 93, evidence that the City's past discrimination was
uncorrected formed the basis upon which the parties negotiated a
consent decree which the Court approved. 4 6 By contrast, in Wy-
gant, the record did not reveal any evidence of discrimination by
the employer and the Court held that a showing of societal dis-
crimination is not enough for an equal protection challenge.4 1 7 The
records in Weber, Johnson, and Local 93, however, all reflected
evidence of possible past or present disparate treatment.
c. Conclusion
To justify affirmative action, the facts or the employer's self-
analysis should reveal at least one employment practice that may
leave the effects of the employer's prior discrimination uncorrected
or that may result in disparate treatment of unidentified members
of the protected class. Neither statistics of a manifest imbalance
alone nor general societal discrimination can constitute a sufficient
showing of discrimination for either Title VII or equal protection
purposes in the affirmative action context because such evidence
does not focus on the employer's intentional discriminatory actions.
However, statistics that reflect employment of members of the
protected class at or very near the "inexorable zero" can be strong,
but not the sole, evidence of a factual basis for affirmative action
under both Title VII and the equal protection clauses.
C. The Remedy
1. The Enunciated Tests
a. Voluntary Plans
1.) Equal Protection
Under the Wygant analysis, a remedy is appropriate where the
means chosen by the state are narrowly tailored to achieve the
intentional selection of applicants from an all-white union was an "arguable
violation."
455. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1460 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The employ-
er's intentional selection of applicants from traditionally all-male departments
was a "firm basis" on which to predicate an affirmative action plan.
456. Local 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3072.
457. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847.
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compelling state interest in eradicating present or past actual or
apparent invidious discrimination.418 While a sharing of the burden
by innocent parties is not impermissible as long as the burden is
not significant, layoffs, as opposed to hirings, impose the entire
burden of achieving racial equality on particular nonminority in-
dividuals; therefore, a layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored for purposes of the equal protection clause.
4 5 9
2.) Title VII
A remedy is appropriate under Weber460 and Johnson 461 if: (1)
the purpose of the plan is directed toward correcting a manifest
imbalance in the work force in traditionally segregated job cate-
gories; (2) the plan does not unduly trammel the rights of the
formerly favored class by calling for set-asides or by upsetting
legitimate rights or firmly rooted expectations; (3) the plan does
not pose an absolute bar to the advancement of the formerly
favored class by reserving positions for the minority or by requiring
the hiring of unqualified or minimally qualified employees or by
mandatory hiring in accordance with a quota; and, (4) the plan is
temporary and will be discontinued when a representative work
force is attained.
b.) Consent Decrees; Injunctions
1.) Title VII
As long as a consent decree does not conflict with section 703,
as in Stotts, 462 the district court is not barred from entering such
a decree merely because it might lack authority under section 706(g)
to do SO.
463
458. Id. at 1852.
459. Id. Justice Powell compared the burden borne by innocent individuals
in cases involving valid general hiring goals as opposed to layoff requirements
and concluded that hiring goals are not as intrusive as the layoffs. Id. While the
goals involve a denial of future employment opportunities, layoffs are too
intrusive as they cause a loss of existing jobs, a disruption of settled expectations
of the stability and security of seniority and impose the entire burden of achieving
racial equality on particular individuals. Id.
460. 443 U.S. at 208-209.
461. 107 S. Ct. at 1455-57.
462. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
463. Local 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077-78. Justice Brennan distinguished Stotts
by explaining that the Court held a disputed modification of a consent decree
could not be entered by the district court where the resulting order was inconsistent
with § 703(h). Id.
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A remedy is narrowly tailored to eliminate egregious discrimi-
nation if: (1) the relief is necessary to eliminate prior egregious
discrimination; (2) the relief is the only feasible alternative in light
of other alternative remedies, such as the imposition of fines, costs,
and fees; (3) the relief is flexible, contains waiver provisions, and
is limited in duration; (4) the relief in the form of a numerical
goal has a relationship to the relevant qualified labor market; and,
(5) the relief does not impact unnecessarily on the rights of third
parties .464
2.) Title VII
Affirmative action relief is appropriate where the remedy, in-
cluding a numerical goal, is designed to eliminate an employer's
persistent or egregious discrimination or to dissipate the lingering
effects of pervasive discrimination.4 65 An affirmative action plan
464. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1066-73. In Local 28, which was decided on
Title VII grounds, Justice Brennan said that the issue of an alleged violation of
the equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment
need not be resolved because the relief ordered passed the most rigorous test: the
government had a compelling interest in remedying proven past discrimination
and the relief was narrowly tailored to further that interest. 106 S. Ct. at 3053.
Justice Powell concurred and would have ruled that the court-ordered goal
met constitutional requirements. In so concluding, he relied on five factors to
determine the proper scope of the race-conscious numerical goal: (1) the efficacy
of alternate remedies; (2) the planned duration of the remedy; (3) the relationship
between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage
of minority group members in the relevant population or the work force; (4) the
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and, (5) the
effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties. Id.
Justice Powell also concluded that the numerical goal comported with con-
stitutional requirements because, absent authority to set a goal as a benchmark
against which it could measure progress in eliminating discriminatory practices,
the district court may have been powerless to provide an effective remedy. Id.
at 3056-57. Justice Powell also noted that the goal was of limited duration and
was directly related to the percentage of nonwhites in the relevant work force;
the goal was not to be applied as an inflexible quota to achieve racial balance
and would not substantially burden nonminorities. Id. He disagreed with Justice
O'Connor's finding that the membership goal was a quota, arguing that the
record did not reflect that the district court had enforced the goal in the rigid
manner that concerned Justice O'Connor. Id. at 3056 n.4.
465. Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3052.
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must be tailored to fit the nature of the violation it seeks to correct
in light of alternatives such as fines and contempt citations; such
a plan must not trammel unnecessarily the interests of the non-
minority employees. 466 Justice O'Connor argues that a numerical
goal with an enddate is not a "goal" but a quota467 and that the





Assuming an appropriate showing of discrimination for affir-
mative action in the the voluntary, 469 consent decree, or judicial
466. Id.
467. Id. at 3059. Justice O'Connor explained the difference between a quota
and a goal:
The imposition of a quota is not truly remedial but rather amounts to a
requirement of racial balance in contravention of section 703(j)'s clear
policy against such requirement . .. [a] goal must be intended to serve
merely as a benchmark for measuring compliance with Title VII and
eliminating the lingering effects of past discrimination, rather than as a
rigid numerical requirement that must unconditionally be met on pain of
sanctions. Id. at 3060.
In Local 28, she argued that the 29.23% membership figure was not a goal
because it required that the racial composition of the Union's membership mirror
that of the relevant labor pool by August 31, 1987 without regard to variables
such as the number of qualified minority applicants available or the number of
apprentices needed. Id.
468. Id. at 3058-62.
469. If the self-analysis shows that employment practices result in disparate
treatment or leave uncorrected the effects of prior discrimination, the employer
has, according to EEOC Reg. 1608, a reasonable basis for adopting or agreeing
to reasonable affirmative action. Regulation 1608.4(c), 41 C.F.R. § 1608.4(c). In
its Affirmative Action Regulation 1604.4(c)(1), the EEOC indicated that appro-
priate affirmative steps could include:
The establishment of a long term goal and short range, interim goals and
timetables for the specific job classifications, all of which should take into
account the availability of basically qualified persons in the relevant job
market;
A recruitment program designed to attract qualified members of the group
in question;
A systematic effort to organize work and re-design jobs in ways that provide
opportunities for persons lacking "journeyman" level knowledge or skills
to enter and, with appropriate training, to progress in a career field;
Revamping selection instruments or procedures which have not yet been
validated in order to reduce or eliminate exclusionary effects on particular
groups in particular job classifications;
The initiation of measures designed to assure that members of the affected
group who are qualified to perform the job are included within the pool
DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW
remedy context, the test for a valid equal protection affirmative
action remedy is identical to the test for a valid Title VII affirmative
action remedy. In Paradise,470 an equal protection judicial remedy
case, a remedy designed to eliminate the employer's intentional
discrimination was found constitutional. In light of the Paradise
circumstances, the temporary remedy did not impose an unaccept-
able burden on innocent white promotion applicants. 47I The pro-
cedure did not bar such promotions nor did it require layoffs or
the discharge of whites; the plan also did not require the hiring of
unqualified blacks over qualified whites. 472 However, in Wygant, 473
a remedy requiring layoffs was found unconstitutional because it
was not narrowly tailored to be the least intrustive means of
accomplishing the employer's stated goal. Finally, in Fullilove ,'474
an equal protection case, the remedy was held constitutional be-
cause it was narrowly tailored to achieve Congress' remedial ob-
jectives, provided for "safety valves" and was subject to continuing
evaluation and reassessment.
For Title VII purposes, the test articulated by the Court in
Weber,4 75 Johnson,47 6 and Local 93,477 was whether the remedy was
a temporary measure designed to eliminate a manifest imbalance
and not to maintain a racial or sexual balance. Such a remedy is
permissible provided it does not unnecessarily trammel the interests
of white employees or create an absolute bar to the advancement
of white employees. The test articulated in Local 28,478 a Title VII
judicial remedy case, reaffirmed that a remedy is valid as long as
it is narrowly tailored to eliminate the employer's discrimination,
complies with the Weber479 standards, and does not trammel un-
necessarily the interests of nonminority employees.
of persons from which the selecting official makes the selection;
A systematic effort to provide career advancement training, both classroom
and on-the-job, to employees locked into dead end jobs; and
The establishement of a system for regularly monitoring the effectiveness of
the particular affirmative action program, and procedures for making timely
adjustments in this program where effectivness is not demonstrated.
470. 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
471. Id. at 1073.
472. Id.
473. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
474. 448 U.S. 448 (1979).
475. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
476. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
477. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
478. Id. at 3072-73.
479. 434 U.S. 193 (1979).
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Based on an analysis of the relevant cases, the test for a valid
Title VII remedy is identical to the test for a valid equal protection
remedy: it must be "narrowly tailored" in light of the available
alternatives. This means that the remedy: (1) must be designed to
eliminate or to correct the identified present or past discrimination
of the employer; (2) must be temporary; (3) must provide for goals
that have "safety valves"; and, (4) must not impinge on the
employee's Title VII rights or expectation interests.
a. Remedy Designed To Eliminate the Employer's
Discrimination
The validity of a remedy which is designed to eliminate an
employer's discrimination depends on the severity of the employer's
past discriminatory conduct. The Court, as reflected in both the
Title VII and equal protection decisions reviewed above, requires
that the remedy be "narrowly tailored" to effectuate the goal of
eliminating the employer's identified present discrimination or of
correcting the effects of the employer's identified past discrimina-
tory conduct. While identified victims should be made whole, the
remedies for unidentified victims can be weaker; alternatives such
as advertising, redesigning of job descriptions, and special training
may be sufficient where specific victims are not identified. On the
other hand, when an employer has been found to have intentionally
discriminated in related cases or in the case at hand, stronger
alternatives such as hiring or promotion goals are appropriate
remedies to eliminate the employer's intentional, and often, egre-
gious discrimination.
1.) Barriers
When the circumstances do not reveal direct evidence of an
intentional refusal to hire minorities but a firm, factual basis reveals
that the employer's current or prior policies were actually barriers
to the employment of minorities, affirmative action remedies should
be designed to remove those barriers. The appropriate "narrowly
tailored" remedy for unidentified victims is not a hiring or pro-
motion goal because the focus of the remedy should be on removal
of the barrier and not on the correction of egregious, intentional
conduct.
For example, if the identified barrier is the minority's lack of
knowledge of job openings because of a policy requiring only in-
house hiring, the appropriate remedy may be publicity and adver-
[1987
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tisements addressed to the minorities; this type of remedy was
upheld in Johnson.40 If a policy requiring in-house promotions
from jobs traditionally held only by males with certain skills is
identified, the appropriate remedy may be to revise the job descrip-
tions, to eliminate the requirement of skills that can only be learned
on the job, to provide on-the-job training and to consider the
applicant's sex along with other factors in making promotion
decisions.41 All of these remedies are narrowly tailored to eliminate
the identified discrimination and involve minimal preference of the
minority over the nonminority. In any event, the stronger the
barrier, the more necessary a goal becomes, and as long as the
goal meets the Weber-Johnson-Wygant test, it should be deemed
appropriate.
2.) Actual Discrimination
When the circumstances reveal a firm factual basis that the
employer, with respect to unidentified victims, is intentionally
engaging in present discrimination or has left uncorrected past
discrimination, the affirmative action remedy should be designed
to eliminate or correct that discrimination. Often, the only way the
parties can measure whether discrimination is eliminated or cor-
rected is by using a goal that serves as a benchmark. 4 2 Whether
the identified discrimination is a union's refusal to admit qualified
black applicants, an employer's varying of job qualifications by
pools of applicants so as to bar the hiring of qualified blacks, or
an employer's reluctance to hire or promote qualified blacks or
women, the appropriate remedy is a goal fashioned in accordance
with the Weber-Local 93-Johnson test.
When a court finds that the employer has intentionally engaged
in egregious discriminatory conduct, the inquiry is the same but
from a different point of view. The question is whether the affir-
mative action remedy, in light of the employer's prior behavior, is
the only way the court, in the exercise of reasonable discretion,
can determine that the present or past discrimination can be elim-
inated or corrected. Evidence such as the violation of prior con-
480. 107 S. Ct. at 1447.
481. The Court approved an affirmative action plan in Johnson, 107 S. Ct.
at 1453-54, which directed that sex or race be considered for the purpose of
remedying the underrepresentation of women and minorities in traditionally
segregated job categories.
482. See the discussion supra note 467.
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tempt orders and the ineffectiveness of the imposition of fines and
fees are probative of that inquiry. For example, in Local 28,483 the
defendants were found in contempt twice before the Court ordered
affirmative action. In Paradise,414the Court made a point of noting
that even if the defendants had been ordered to pay fines and
attorney's fees, the result would not have been different.
Therefore, in both the voluntary and judicial remedy context,
for both equal protection and Title VII purposes, a goal can be a
remedy narrowly tailored to eliminate the employer's discrimina-
tion. A goal can be fashioned to require that the percentage of
minorities in the employer's work force reflects the percentage of
the minorities in the qualified labor force. The goal can be nu-
merical and can specify an enddate in the most egregious circum-
stances. In all cases, however, the goal should include "safety
valves" and must be administered by the court and the parties as
a benchmark, not as a rigid quota, to measure the degree to which
the discrimination has been eliminated or corrected.
b. Remedy That Is Temporary and Has Flexible Goals
A remedy is temporary and has flexible goals when it is designed
to cease once the goal is reached 485 and to provide for "safety
valves" so that it does not operate as a rigid quota. A remedy
includes "safety valves" when it provides for modification in the
event that there are no qualified minorities in the available work
force or there are no qualified minority applicants, or there is a
reduction-in-force by the employer due to economic problems, or
similar non-discrimination-related situations.
The question of whether the stated "goal" is in fact a "quota"
has been addressed in every case. Some Justices view any remedy
involving percentages as an "illegal quota". Most Justices, how-
ever, permit "flexible goals" that provide for "safety valves" in
the event that the available number of qualified minorities is less
than the goal or the available jobs or promotions are limited for
reasons other than affirmative action. A goal, therefore, becomes
a quota when a fixed percentage of hirings or promotions is
required by a fixed enddate, 41 6 and no "safety valves" are provided.
483. 106 S. Ct. at 3030.
484. 107 S. Ct. at 1069 and n.24.
485. The last sentence of Regulation 1604(c)(2)(1) reflects this purpose.
486. In Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3059, Justice O'Connor dissented stating
that the "goal" was an illegal quota because it included an enddate, and,
therefore, required racial preferential hirings without "safety valves".
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c. The Remedy Must Weigh the Competing Interests of the
Nonminority Employees And The Minority Employees So That
No Statutory Rights or Expectation Interests Are Infringed
Stotts487 and Local 93488 teach that a proposed remedy will not
be deemed "narrowly tailored" if it infringes on the Title VII
rights of a nonminority employee or another interested party. 48 9
Also, the proposed remedy will not be deemed "narrowly tailored"
if it infringes on a valid expectation interest (i.e., the expectation
that one will not be laid off to provide a job for a minority).
490
The Title VII test set out in Weber491 and Johnson492 reflects this
theme by mandating that the remedy must not trammel unneces-
sarily the interests of white employees, require the hiring of un-
qualified blacks or create an absolute bar to the advancement of
white employees. The equal protection test, as stated in Paradise ,49
also reflects this theme by requiring that the remedy impose no
unacceptable burden on innocent white promotion applicants. The
remedy can delay, but cannot completely bar, white promotions.
Also, the remedy may not require the layoff or discharge of whites
and may not require the hiring of unqualified blacks over qualified
whites. For both Title VII and equal protection purposes, therefore,
if the proposed remedy is tailored so that the employee's statutory
487. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
488. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
489. Other interested parties may include a union or other similar persons.
In Local 93, the Court ruled that unions and white employees, regardless of a
consent decree, can litigate their own claims. Id. at 3079; cf. Ashley v. City of
Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983). Nonminority employees who challenge the plan on
constitutional or Title VII grounds must carry the burden of persuasion that the
employer's evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and,
therefore, the plan was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at
1856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Failure of a joined party to agree to a consent decree does not deprive the decree
of effect. This term, the Supreme Court will decide issues of intervention. Marino
v. Ortiz, Costello v. New York City P.D., cert. granted., No. 86-1415 (May 18,
1987). Also, while a union cannot prevent an employer from entering into a
consent decree. The union has a remedy under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act for
breach of a collective bargaining contract. Where an employer enters into a
conciliation agreement with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
that is contrary to its contract with a union, the union's remedy is the same. W.
R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
490. See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986) and Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
491. 443 U.S. at 208.
492. 107 S. Ct. at 1455.
493. 107 S. Ct. at 1073-74.
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rights or expectation interests are not infringed, it meets the third
condition of the remedy test.
1.) Layoffs and Firings of Innocent, Nonminority Employees
Layoffs and firings of innocent nonminority employees where no
valid seniority system exists should not be deemed a "narrowly
tailored" remedy, except in some reduction-in-force situations. The
Court is clear that layoffs and firings of innocent, nonminority
employees, in contravention of a valid, bona fide seniority system
which is protected by section 703(h), are not "narrowly tailored"
remedies. This is so because the nonminority employee's expectation
interest in not being fired or laid off to provide a job for a minority
will usually supercede the competing interests of the minorities.
The same reasoning applies to layoffs and firings that occur where
no seniority system is present. Layoffs and firings are drastic
measures that substantially affect the employee's financial, social,
and emotional well-being. In any analysis, the interests of the
nonminority, innocent employee would be quite great. This is so
even though the nonminority employee may have a cause of action
for unjust dismissal494 because the time and expense involved in
pursuing such an action in combination with the loss of job would
almost always outweigh a minority's interests. Delayed promotions
and hirings do not have the effect that layoffs and firings have
and in the affirmative action analysis, would not be accorded as
much weight. Even if the employee is not protected by a valid
seniority system, layoffs or firings would violate the employee's
"expectation interests". Such action is never sufficiently "narrowly
tailored" in light of the availability of hiring, promotion, or
training alternatives.
494. In some states, employees have a cause of action for unjust dismissal
under three theories: contract, tort, or dismissal against public policy. Under the
contract theory, if the discharge occurs without "just cause", the employer may
be found to have violated an implied covenant of good faith. Under the tort
theory, if the discharge violates some right protected under federal or state law,
the employee has a cause of action for "wrongful discharge." Under the public
policy exception, if the discharge occurs because an employee refused to commit
a crime or exercised a statutory right or privilege, the employee has a cause of
action for wrongful discharge on the basis of a public policy violation.
In a related context, some of the lower courts have recognized a contractual right
in the minority where an affirmative action plan, or a statement of affirmative
action principles in an employee handbook, are not followed. Sola v. Lafayette
College. 804 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1986); Liao v. Dean. 94 Daily Labor Reporter D-
I (N.D. Ala. May 18, 1987).
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In the reduction-in-force situation where no valid collective bar-
gaining agreement prescribes the method of job reduction, the
employer determines what jobs are to be eliminated and which
employees in jobs that are not eliminated should be terminated.
The latter decision is usually based on job performance. An em-
ployer who has in place a valid affirmative action plan which meets
the standards discussed in this article may have an affirmative duty
to retain or hire a minority rather than an equally qualified non-
minority to avoid resegregating the work force or to overcome the
pattern of past discrimination. In this narrow situation, where the
employer has engaged in a pattern of past uncorrected or present
discrimination and there is no valid collective bargaining agreement
prescribing the method of job reduction, the layoff or termination
of the nonminority may be appropriate.
2.) Contract Rights and Rights Protected by State Law
Where the affirmative action remedy is promotions rather than
firings and layoffs, a nonminority employee may claim that his
contractual right to promotion, as provided for in his employment
contract, should be accorded great weight in the balancing process.
The same argument could be made if an employee has promotion
rights under a seniority system or under state law. Since the
employee has a cause of action for violations of those rights and
since the issue is delayed promotion, rather than job loss, it is
suggested that the court would not assign as great weight to the
nonminority employee's interests in the promotions as it would in
a layoff situation. 495
d. Conclusion
Assuming an appropriate showing of discrimination for the vol-
untary or judicial remedy, the test for a valid equal protection
affirmative action remedy is identical to the test for a valid Title
VII affirmative action remedy. The remedy must be "narrowly
495. The Court, particularly Justice O'Connor, consistently makes clear
that even if the affirmative action remedy is deemed valid, the nonminority
employees or other interested parties can still sue the employer or the union for
violation of their rights. In a related case, the Supreme Court recently held that
a union, pursuant to its duty of fair representation, must bargain for an affir-
mative action plan or must protest an employer's discrimination. See Goodman
v. Lukens Steel, 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987).
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tailored" in light of the alternatives which means that it: (1) must
be designed to eliminate or to correct the identified present or past
discrimination of the employer; (2) must be temporary; (3) must
provide for goals that have "safety valves"; and, (4) must not
impinge on the employee's Title VII rights or expectation interests.
III. CONCLUSION
The critical unanswered question 496 is whether a public employer
who, in compliance with Title VII, has agreed to affirmative action
remedies or who enters a consent decree providing for the same,
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
or the equal protection component of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. The answer is no.
The controlling test for both Title VII and equal protection
challenges for all types of plans involves the identical two-pronged
inquiry (1) is there a sufficient demonstration of intentional dis-
crimination by the employer; and, (2) is the remedy "narrowly
tailored", in light of other alternatives, to eliminate that discrim-
ination.
* The discrimination prong, for both Title VII and equal protection
purposes, can be demonstrated by evidence, for all but the judicial
remedy, of a firm factual basis, short of an admission of discrim-
ination by the employer, that one or more employment practices
may leave uncorrected the effects of the employer's prior discrim-
ination or may result in disparate treatment of members of the
protected class. This factual basis can not be demonstrated by statistics
496. The Court has not addressed the issue of the validity of affirmative
action plans implemented in compliance with Executive Order 11246, various
federal funding statutes or state and local laws. Under the Fullilove analysis of
a statute, as long as there is a showing of a history of past discrimination and
the remedy is narrowly tailored, such plans should be deemed valid. See General
Contactors v. San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) (governmental contract
set-aside for minorities ruled invalid because government had made no finding
of prior discrimination), See also Ohio Contractors Assoc. v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167
(6th Cir. 1983) (minority set-aside ruled valid because city had demonstrated prior
history of discrimination); Edinger & Son v. Louisville, 802 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.
1986).
Voluntary affirmative action plans adopted in order to comply with local
laws requiring racial balance in a public employer's work force, but without a
showing of a history of past discrimination, was ruled invalid under both Title
VII and the Constitution because there was no predicate of discrimination and
no consideration or use of alternatives. (This decision was pre-Johnson.) Hammon
v. Berry, 813 F.2d 412, 43 FEP Cases 89 (D.C. Cir 1987).
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which show that a challenged policy or practice has an adverse im-
pact. On the other hand, the factual basis can be demonstrated by
statistics which are sufficient to sustain a pattern and practice case.
In such a case, the plaintiff may use statistics which show a manifest
imbalance between the presence of minorities in the employer's work
force and the qualified minorities in the relevant labor pool; as long
as the plaintiff demonstrates that the employer used a policy or prac-
tice that may have had or may have a discriminatory effect.
The remedy component can be satisfied, for both Title VII and
equal protection purposes, only if the remedy is "narrowly tai-
lored" to the situation in light of other reasonable alternatives. A
"narrowly tailored" remedy is one which is designed to eliminate
the identified discrimination of the employer, is temporary, pro-
vides for goals, not quotas, includes "safety valves", and does not
unreasonably impinge on the employee's Title VII rights or expec-
tation interests. Regardless of whether the challenge is under Title
VII or the equal protection clause, when affirmative action has
been designed to meet this two-pronged test, the judicial remedy
is approved by a majority of the Court, even where the remedy is
a numerical goal with an enddate.
To address the introductory quotation, there is no reverse dis-
crimination where the focus of affirmative action is on identifying
and remedying, in a narrowly tailored fashion, the employer's
actual or probable disparate treatment of protected individuals or
members of a protected class. When that occurs, black is certainly not
white and white is certainly not black.
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